The International Architecture for Prevention

Primary responsibility for mitigating shocks and reducing risks rests with states and national authorities. However, international and regional engagement has proven pivotal in supporting national pathways to peace. Most of this support has been bilateral, but where national interests align, the international community has come together around an international architecture to prevent violence and sustain peace.

Following World War II, the foundations for this architecture were put in place, rooted in the United Nations (UN) Charter and customary international law. The primary purpose of this architecture is to “maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace.” Over the last 70 years, this architecture has, arguably, succeeded at its primary aim by providing a framework for continuous consultation that has significantly reduced the risk of conflict between the great powers. This success has been achieved in large part by having provided a forum in which the major military powers of our era “debate international problems and seek constructive solutions” (von Einsiedel, Malone, and Ugarte 2015, 828).

Primarily focused on reducing the risks of interstate conflict, over the past 30 years, this system, with the support of member states, developed what scholars have recently identified as a “standard treatment” for intrastate conflict: the mediation of political settlements, investment in peacekeeping operations to implement agreements reached, and a focus on prevention of abuses (Gowan and Stedman 2018). Despite criticism, this treatment has “achieved stability and security at relatively low cost” in many countries (Eikenberry and Krasner 2017, 9).

Today the international architecture deploys multilateral tools ranging from regional political offices to complex, multi-dimensional peace operations working across development, diplomatic, and security pillars. In an interconnected world, these efforts are increasingly based on cooperation between international and regional organizations and engage states in efforts to address international, regional, and subnational levels of conflict. However, despite these evolutions, changes in the nature of violent conflicts mentioned in chapter 1 and international affairs in chapter 2, this architecture is struggling to identify collective remedies to increasingly complex situations on the ground.

This chapter analyzes the international and regional architecture for prevention, as well as the tools developed to prevent violent conflict, in light of current challenges. In particular, with conflicts becoming increasingly protracted and transnational, as seen in chapters 1 and 2, and with strong correlations between intergroup grievances and violence, as seen in chapters 4 and 5, this chapter reexamines the relevance of the
existing architecture and tools and provides examples of how they might further adapt to confront current challenges. In particular, the chapter highlights the potential benefits of engaging earlier, more comprehensively, and in a more sustained manner to address risks of violence.

As chapter 3 notes, the state is the central actor influencing a society’s pathway and the point of reference for preventive action. National governments have the authority and capacity to establish or reform institutions, allocate the resources necessary to tackle structural causes of violence, and address the processes by which the risks of violence manifest. Internationally, governments influence country pathways through direct bilateral relations and aid, including security assistance (box 7.1), and through international legal frameworks and multilateral institutions.

**BOX 7.1 International Engagement through Military and Police Assistance**

The most widespread form of international engagement in peace and security assistance across states occurs through the bilateral financing, equipping, and training of national military, police, and intelligence services by allies. The nature of such assistance can have a profound influence on the risks faced by a society and, more important, how national actors seek to manage such risks. Donor countries have used bilateral military cooperation to help institutionalize security systems that protect recipient countries, professionalize the security sector, and forge stronger alliances based on mutual military dependence (D. M. Anderson and McKnight 2014; Fisher and Anderson 2015; Poe 1991; Wendt and Barnett 1993).

The level of foreign military assistance is not included in the official development assistance (ODA) figures. This division reflects a firewall between military and development resources and institutions, which contributes to the fact that these two streams often are not coordinated. Indeed, they often are at odds in the material effects and signals about international priorities that they send to the population and to the elites of recipient countries. Harmonizing decisions about military and development cooperation can make them more credible. Because of sensitivities regarding the core state function of security and circumscribed authority, external actors have only slowly become comfortable with expanding development assistance to the security sector. Development assistance is subject to greater scrutiny and different standards than military assistance.

While often essential for international security, military assistance has produced mixed results in addressing internal security challenges. As noted in chapter 5, a focus on creating accountable and professional security sector institutions with civilian oversight can facilitate effective conflict prevention. Most bilateral financing for military and police, however, has gone to enhancing operational capacities rather than to transformative reforms conducive to preventing conflict and building peace (Bryden and Olonisakin 2010, 9; Donnelly 1997). In addition, bilateral military and police assistance at the country level is not always effectively coordinated, resulting in conflicting or competing interests; a mismatch of standards and approaches with respect to training, equipment, and reform processes; and deficits in national ownership.

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a. After 13 consecutive years of increases (from 1998 to 2011), world military spending has plateaued, at an estimated US$1,686 billion in 2016, equivalent to 2.2 percent of global gross domestic product or US$227 per person (Tian et al. 2017). No military equipment or services are reportable as ODA. Antiterrorism activities are also excluded. However, the cost of using the donors’ armed forces to deliver humanitarian aid is included. Similarly, most peacekeeping expenditures are excluded in line with the exclusion of military costs. However, some closely defined developmentally relevant activities within peacekeeping operations are included (Development Assistance Committee 2017).
Systemic Prevention

Beyond the more visible deployments and actions by multilateral institutions, state engagement in preventive action has included a focus on systemic prevention, defined by United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan as “measures to address global risks of conflict that transcend particular states” (UN General Assembly 2006a, 1). Systemic prevention addresses transnational risks that can contribute to violent conflict and be dealt with effectively only by global partnerships. It includes, for example, measures to deal with illicit economies, including trafficking and the use and trade of arms, all of which are also addressed in the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), and weapons of mass destruction; address war crimes and crimes against humanity; respond to health epidemics such as human immunodeficiency virus/acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (HIV/AIDS) and Ebola; and create broad coalitions to address climate change.

Understood this way, prevention lies at the heart of the rules-based international order. The international system, including the United Nations, the Bretton Woods institutions, regional security arrangements, and even development as a practice, was built, in part, around the notion that the world needed consensual norms and rules to minimize the risk that conflict could escalate into violence (Schlesinger 2004). The United Nations system—in particular, the UN Security Council—and specialized agencies like the International Atomic Energy Agency have played a significant role in facilitating intergovernmental treaties, enabling multilateral action, and fostering transnational advocacy networks. Together, this global infrastructure transmits and promotes norms against violence (Keck and Sikkink 1999; Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999). This system, designed primarily to regulate interstate conflict (box 7.2), has evolved significantly to address broader risks associated with violent conflict (box 7.3).

BOX 7.2 Public International Law and Armed Conflict

International law establishes the obligations of signatory states and provides the most powerful framework for the conduct of states and organized armed groups in armed conflict. Public international law. The following branches of public international law are directly relevant to situations of armed conflict.

International humanitarian law. The four Geneva Conventions, three additional protocols, and other international treaties (ICRC n.d.). It regulates the conduct of states and organized nonstate armed groups that are party to an armed conflict. International humanitarian law applies during armed conflict to protect persons who are not or no longer participating in hostilities and restricts the means and methods of war between fighting parties.

International human rights law derives principally from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UN General Assembly 1948) and nine core UN human rights treaties as well as regional human rights instruments such as the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. International human rights law recognizes fundamental rights for individuals and groups, which states must respect, protect, and fulfill. It applies during peacetime and during armed conflict.

International criminal law prohibits certain acts considered to be the most serious crimes (such as war crimes, crimes against humanity, the crime of aggression, and genocide) and regulates the investigation, prosecution, and punishment of individual perpetrators. The Rome Statute (UN Secretary-General 1998) establishes the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court for the

(Box continued next page)
investigation and prosecution of crimes under international criminal law.

**Rules on interstate use of force.**
The UN Charter prohibits the threat or use of force against another state. One exception to this rule is the right of a state to use force in self-defense in case of an armed attack (UN Charter, Art. 51). Short of this exception, only the UN Security Council is entitled to authorize the use of force against another state to maintain or restore international peace and security (UN Charter, Ch. VII).

**Peremptory norms.** International law contains certain rules that are accepted and recognized by states as allowing for no derogation. The prohibitions of aggression, torture, slavery, racial discrimination, genocide, and crimes against humanity are examples of peremptory norms.

*Source: McInerney-Lankford 2017.*

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**BOX 7.3 The Evolution of International Approaches to Conflict Prevention**

Although the international system was, and remains, largely premised on the concept of state sovereignty, countries are increasingly interdependent, and risks are not confined to national borders. New and complex challenges have arisen since the end of the Cold War that range from terrorism and violent extremism to cybersecurity, from climate change to massive forced displacement, and from global illicit activities to outbreaks of disease.

These trends have motivated a new and explicit emphasis within the UN on addressing not only new forms of conflict, but also all phases of conflict. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali highlighted this focus on conflict prevention in the 1992 Agenda for Peace, which identifies as guiding concepts preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping, and postconflict peacebuilding (UN Secretary-General 2001). Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s 2001 report on the prevention of armed conflict also emphasizes the mutually reinforcing nature of conflict prevention and sustainable and equitable development. It states that the primary responsibility for prevention lies with national governments supported by civil society and distinguishes between operational prevention focused on an impending crisis and structural prevention focused on keeping crises from arising in the first place (UN Secretary-General 2001). The 2006 progress report on armed conflict prevention expands on these concepts, introducing systemic prevention or measures that address global risks of conflict that “transcend particular states” (UN General Assembly 2006a).

In 2014, the Security Council passed its first resolution explicitly on conflict prevention (S/RES/2150) (UN Security Council 2014). This recalled that the “prevention of conflict remains a primary responsibility of States” and further recalled their “primary responsibility to protect civilians and to respect and ensure the human rights of all individuals within their territory and subject to their jurisdiction.” This resolution conceived of the UN’s tools as including special political missions (such as regional offices) peacekeeping operations, and the Peacebuilding Commission, as well as regional and subregional organizations and arrangements and acknowledged that serious abuses and violations of international human rights or humanitarian law, including sexual and gender-based violence, can be an early indication of descent into conflict or escalation of conflict.

*(Box continued next page)*
Despite these multiple commitments, three major strategic reviews of the UN’s peace and security functions in 2015 found that prevention remains “the poor relative of better resourced peace operations deployed during and after armed conflict.” Building on these 2015 reports, the General Assembly and Security Council sustaining peace resolutions articulated a conceptual vision and operational guidance for member states and the United Nations system. Advancing beyond linear understandings of conflict prevention, the resolutions concluded that sustaining peace should be “broadly understood as a goal and a process to build a common vision of a society, ensuring that the needs of all segments of the population are taken into account, which encompasses activities aimed at preventing the outbreak, escalation, continuation, and recurrence of conflict” (UN General Assembly 2016a; UN Security Council 2016). The sustaining peace resolutions underlined the importance of additional, urgent support in contexts where the risk of crisis is heightened, and the need for tools to address root causes, especially in societies having difficulties working toward the SDGs.

Source: Call 2017.

a. Defined as an “action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing dispute/s from escalating into conflicts, and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur.”

b. The report of the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) underscored the importance of preventing conflict, concluding that the prevention of armed conflict was “the greatest responsibility of the international community” and yet remained underprioritized and underresourced (UN 2015). At the same time, an Advisory Group of Experts that conducted a review of peacebuilding architecture, under a mandate from the General Assembly and the Security Council, concluded, “A broader, comprehensive approach of sustaining peace is called for, all along the arc leading from conflict prevention … through peacemaking and peacekeeping, and on to postconflict recovery and reconstruction” (UN General Assembly 2016a). The 2015 report of the Secretary-General regarding the global study on the implementation of Security Council Resolution 1325 underlined the importance of bringing women’s participation and leadership to the core of peace and security efforts, including responses to new and emerging threats (UN Secretary-General 2015; UN Security Council 2000).

As the primary multilateral body responsible for maintaining international peace and security and the sole international body, in principle, able to authorize the use of force outside of self-defense, the UN Security Council possesses a range of tools for preventing, managing, and responding to violent conflict. Chapter VI of the UN Charter provides a framework for the Security Council’s engagement in the peaceful settlement of disputes brought to its attention, including through investigative and fact-finding activities. Chapter VI also provides the framework for the Security Council’s own direct engagements in recommending actions to the parties of a conflict or in support of the efforts of the secretary-general (see, for example, UN Department of Political Affairs 2015b). Chapter VII of the UN Charter provides the framework within which the Security Council may take enforcement action. It allows the Security Council to “determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression” and to make recommendations or to resort to nonmilitary and military action to “maintain or restore international peace and security” (UN Department of Political Affairs 2015b).3

Through these frameworks, the Security Council can take decisions at all stages of the conflict cycle and within a wide array of responses, ranging from simply calling for parties to resolve a dispute peacefully, to directing the terms or principles by which a conflict will be resolved, to authorizing enforcement measures to ensure the implementation of its decisions (von Einsiedel, Malone, and Ugarte 2015). Ultimately the effectiveness of these tools, as with all other facets of the Security Council’s work, depends on the collective willingness of states to respond to threats to international peace and security (Wood 2013).
In practice, absent a major crisis to mobilize collective action, the Security Council has tended to “stand back” (von Einsiedel, Malone, and Ugarte 2015). Actions have tended toward crisis management and response, and, as noted by the UN Security Council (2017, 2), “Despite strong rhetorical support for prevention, … concrete, meaningful preventive action is too often lacking.” Tasked increasingly with dealing with conflicts within rather than between states, Security Council mechanisms can encounter resistance to actions that could challenge or weaken sovereign rights and responsibilities, both of council members and of states on the council agenda (von Einsiedel, Malone, and Ugarte 2015). At the same time, the number and complexity of ongoing conflicts in which the Security Council is engaged distract from less immediate but potentially preventable conflicts (UN Security Council 2017).

Beyond crisis management, UN member states are also working through the Security Council to establish global norms related to conflict situations through thematic debates and resolutions. This work covers a range of topics, including protection of civilians; children and armed conflict; justice, rule of law, and impunity; women, peace, and security; and sexual violence in conflict (Keating 2015). Increasingly, the Security Council is addressing nontraditional security threats, such as piracy, illicit trafficking, and organized crime and climate change (von Einsiedel, Malone, and Ugarte 2015).

Globally, the General Assembly has broad authority to consider conflict prevention within the framework of the UN Charter. It has held special or emergency sessions on a wide range of prevention-related thematic and geographic issues. It has adopted declarations on peace, the peaceful settlement of disputes, and international cooperation, notably the landmark resolution on sustaining peace in 2016 (UN General Assembly 2016a). As the leading intergovernmental body specialized in policy and coordination on economic, social, and environmental issues, the Economic and Social Council is the central UN platform for reflection, debate, and innovative thinking on sustainable development.

Beyond the traditional chambers of the United Nations system, the multilateral system has expanded and evolved within a broader trend of proliferation of actors on the global scene. This brings greater diversity of both instruments and forums engaging in systemic prevention, but also contributes to a fragmentation of global governance (Biermann et al. 2009; Koskenniemi and Leino 2002). There are four times as many state actors today as in 1945 and a growing number and diversity of nonstate actors (Thakur 2011). In 1951, there were only 123 intergovernmental organizations. By 2013, there were 7,710 (ICM 2017). The emergence of bodies such as the G-20 speaks to a desire for wider global steering groups, while the growth of regional instruments—for example, the European Partnership process—has expanded the range of institutional frameworks engaged in promoting prevention.

The UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development encapsulates the increased interlinkages between efforts at systemic prevention. The SDGs call for integrated solutions extending across development, peace, environment, and humanitarian realms and recognize the critical importance of sustainability to development progress as well as the importance of investing in global (and regional) public goods (Framtid 2015; Jenks and Kharas 2016). The SDGs also include specific targets on human trafficking, illicit financial and arms flows, and organized crime. The SDGs confirm that building resilience through investment in inclusive and sustainable development—including addressing inequalities, strengthening institutions, and ensuring that development strategies are risk-informed—is the best means of prevention.

Regional Action

Amid a changing global order and the mutation of conflict away from conventionally fought interstate wars, regional organizations have become increasingly important actors in preventive action. Conceived as a first resort for challenges to security that transcend national territories (Verjee 2017), regional capacities are also seen as critical to
reducing the risks of regional contagion and instability caused by the rise of nonstate actors and intrastate conflict, with a focus on Africa. With the emergence of armed groups with transnational goals, the concentration of conflicts in regions where neighboring countries have endogenous risk factors, and the increase in international interference (Walter 2017), regional responses, whether positive or negative, are likely to remain important.

Long recognized as key partners of global institutions,6 regional and subregional organizations have evolved considerably since the end of the Cold War. Differences in size, membership structure, and strategic objectives notwithstanding, many such organizations have experienced an expansion of their mandates, legal frameworks, and organizational capacities to address a broad range of regional political, security, and economic issues.

In particular, and with the support of the Security Council, some regional and subregional organizations have acquired considerable authority to engage in conflict management (Nathan 2010). These include the European Union (EU), which promotes peace through cooperation and integration in economic, political, and, increasingly, security matters; the African Union, which has developed specialized institutions and capacities to support political mediation, crisis management, postconflict reconstruction, and peacekeeping, the most notable example of which is the African Union Mission in Somalia (D. M. Anderson and McKnight 2014); and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), which is empowered to act in the case of threats to stability through political, economic, and military means (Fisher and Anderson 2015; box 7.4). The growing significance of regional and subregional organizations in conflict prevention is reflected in increasingly complex and multidimensional cooperation among them as well as with the United Nations.7

Other regional organizations serve more as forums for coordination between regional states, with their engagement and role in conflict management structured on an intergovernmental basis and with limited operational and institutional mandates or capacities for autonomous action. These include the League of Arab States and the Southern African Development Community, among others, which serve primarily as platforms for coordinated political, diplomatic, and sometimes military engagement in crises and conflicts.

While regional organizations vary in their normative frameworks and capacity, some have had success in forging a consensus on common priorities among states, sometimes serving as a pacesetter in transformative agendas. These include, for example, the African Union’s legal provision of the right to intervene in grave human rights violations as contained in Article 4(h) of its Constitutive Act;8 the development of an ambitious Agenda 2063 on regional integration (African Union Commission 2015); and the immediate priority of “Silencing the Guns by 2020.”9

Regional and subregional economic communities, in particular, have gone beyond fostering economic cooperation and integration to providing important platforms for addressing regional threats to peace and security. Approximately 33 regional economic organizations have been founded since 1989, and 29 regionally based intergovernmental organizations have an established agenda related to peace and security. Part of the importance of regional economic communities has been their role in implementing regional integration agendas bridging peace, security, and economic cooperation. Based on this cooperation, regional economic communities are playing increasingly operational roles targeting subregional threats—for example, through regional coalitions such as the Multinational Joint Taskforce against Boko Haram, the G-5 Sahel, or the Regional Coalition Initiative against the Lord’s Resistance Army.

The increasing role of regional organizations in addressing threats to stability and security in their regions is most evident in regional peacekeeping operations and regionally coordinated and negotiated security responses (box 7.3). The African Union and ECOWAS (box 7.4) peace operations have increased, especially in the initial stages of international deployments, and
Among subregional organizations, ECOWAS stands out for its successes in conflict mitigation and peacekeeping in West Africa. In the post–Cold War era, ECOWAS has expanded its institutional structures to respond to security threats emanating from intrastate conflicts in the region. This has entailed diplomatic investment in developing normative and legal tools to address conflict risks long before any specific crisis, and developing dedicated capacities for regional early warning and response. Under the 1999 Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping, and Security and the 2001 Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance, ECOWAS became engaged in preventing and managing conflict in West Africa. In 2002, the Observation and Monitoring Centre of ECOWAS partnered with the West African Network for Peacebuilding, a civil society organization established in 1998 in Ghana, to implement a regional early warning and early response system, the Early Warning and Response Network (ECOWARN). Since 2006, ECOWAS has maintained a standby force, a 6,500-strong rapid-response brigade known as ECOBRIG. In 2008, the organization also established the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework aimed at addressing the structural causes of violent conflict.

Source: Marc, Verjee, and Mogaka 2015.

Box 7.4 Subregional Organizations and Prevention: ECOWAS

have at times proven quicker to deploy than other multilateral missions, as well as generally more willing to use military force, if necessary. However, these operations are at times poorly funded and equipped relative to the enormity of the task at hand, and a heavy strategic focus on military action has sometimes come at the expense of a holistic civilian-led approach (De Coning and Prakash 2016). Salehyan and Gleditsch (2006), Salehyan (2009), and more recently Goldstone et al. (2010) have shown that one relatively good predictor of whether a country will experience a civil war is whether neighboring countries are experiencing civil war. Given their knowledge of the regional context and vested interest in preventing regional instability, regional and subregional organizations possess inherent attributes that often afford them greater efficacy and legitimacy to assume the role of mediators (Ibrahim 2016). Their proximity and access to regional and national stakeholders allow them to engage and intervene more quickly when crises occur. These advantages are reflected, for instance, in the success of the African Union in mediating an end to electoral violence in Kenya in 2008 (Lindenmayer and Kaye 2009) and the instrumental role of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in negotiations on ending the war in Sudan in 2005 (Healy 2009). However, when consensus among member states cannot be established, perceptions of partiality exist, or critical capacities are in short supply, regional and subregional organizations are faced with difficult challenges that may curtail their effectiveness in preventing and managing conflict.

International Tools for Prevention

Over the past decades, the international community has developed tools for preventing the outbreak, escalation, continuation, and relapse of conflict. While historically linked to international multilateral institutions, such tools are increasingly, if unevenly, shared with regional and subregional organizations. These tools, ranging from remote monitoring of risks to deployments through in-country peace operations, have evolved considerably to deal with the growing complexity of conflicts.
Engagements are increasingly aimed at the entire cycle of conflict from outbreak to relapse, regional and subregional operations are more frequent, and multilateral deployments are increasingly recognizing the importance of multidimensional approaches integrating political, security, and development efforts.

Nevertheless, the current amount of attention to and spending on prevention amounts to a fraction of the quantity spent responding to crisis or on rebuilding afterward, and the existing tools remain challenged by the changing nature of violent conflict. The following sections provide an overview of several operational instruments through which states provide support through multilateral frameworks for prevention, highlighting the evolution of policy, practice, and the extent and potential for greater convergence between international political, security, and development actors.

**Early Warning Systems**

Early warning systems (EWSs) play a significant role in the international field of conflict prevention. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development defines early warning as “a process that (a) alerts decision makers to the potential outbreak, escalation, and resurgence of violent conflict and (b) promotes an understanding among decision makers of the nature and impacts of violent conflict” (OECD 2009, 22). EWSs are practical tools relying on qualitative or quantitative data on medium- and short-term risks, with the intention of directly informing or supporting preventive actions. EWSs help in formulating best- and worst-case scenarios and response options and then communicate the findings to decision makers (Mwaura and Schmeidl 2002).

Initial models of early warning emerged in the 1970s. After the end of the Cold War, these systems developed rapidly, using both qualitative and quantitative data to improve the accuracy of predictions and extend their time horizons. Today diverse types of EWS exist: governmental, intergovernmental, and nongovernmental.

- Government systems were designed, for example, in France (Système d’Alerte Précoce, located at the General Secretariat for National Defense) and Germany (BMZ Crisis Early Warning System).
- At the intergovernmental level, the African Union has developed a Continental Early Warning System to advise the Peace and Security Council on “potential conflict and threats to peace and security” and “recommend best courses of action.” IGAD has designed the Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN) as an institutional foundation for addressing conflicts in the region. It is a collaborative effort of the member states of IGAD (Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, and Uganda). ECOWAS has also developed ECOWARN to collect and analyze data and draft up-to-date reports on possible emerging crises, ongoing crises, and postcrisis transitions.
- Nongovernmental organizations have set up their own EWSs. The nonprofit organization International Crisis Group uses qualitative methods and field research to produce a monthly early warning bulletin, *Crisis Watch*, designed to provide global warnings of impending violence; the Forum on Early Warning and Early Response–Africa focuses on the Ituri region in the Democratic Republic of Congo; and the Early Warning and Early Response Project focuses on Timor-Leste (Defontaine 2017).

Good practices of EWSs include (a) the use of field networks of monitors; (b) application of both qualitative and quantitative analytical methodologies; (c) use of technology; (d) regular monitoring and reporting, as conflict dynamics evolve rapidly; and (e) assurance of a strong interconnection between early warning and response, as emphasized in third-generation EWSs (Nyheim 2015).

While converging qualitative and quantitative evidence suggests that EWSs can provide accurate information of impending violent conflict in the short term (Chadefaux 2014; Ward et al. 2013), most
models cannot make long-term projections (longer than two to three years) or predict the location, intensity, and trajectory of impending violence. At the same time, even when predictions are accurate, finding entry points for action, particularly in the context of current conflict dynamics, can be challenging. However, even the best EWS will have minimal effect if not used to inform preventive action. The short time horizons of warnings can limit the scope of relevant preventive action and make it difficult to sustain engagement beyond contingency planning. Likewise, EWSs rarely address how much uncertainty is associated with concrete predictions, with the result that action rarely immediately follows warning (box 7.5; Brandt, Freeman, and Schrodt 2011a, 2011b; King and Zeng 2001). For this reason, some countries have developed dialogue processes among a variety of stakeholders to analyze data from different sources and channel this information into more coordinated action. In particular, violence observatories have become common tools to support the design and implementation of violence prevention actions, especially in urban areas. Observatories grew out of the experience of city governments in Latin America and have been central to government efforts to reduce gang and interpersonal violence in cities like Bogotá, Medellín, and Río de Janeiro. Observatories usually involve regular meetings by stakeholders from different sectors—law enforcement, health, and urban development, for example—to analyze trends in violence and take coordinated actions to address it (Duque, Caicedo, and Sierra 2008; Sur 2014). They have been adapted to some situations of armed conflict, such as Indonesia (Barron and Sharpe 2005).

Protection of Civilians and Prevention of Mass Atrocities

Human rights violations, discrimination, and abuse are among the major warning signs of instability and conflict, and monitoring and reporting of such abuses provide the evidence base from which to devise actions. The UN Charter establishes a link between protection of human rights and maintenance of international peace and security, and the Universal Periodic Review undertaken by the Human Rights Council is the main institutional review mechanism for all 193 UN member states. The power of these systems lies not only in their triggering of action, but also their acceptance as a basis for standard setting across countries. Recognizing that where preventive action fails, international action must protect the lives and dignity of civilians caught up in conflict, international action has advocated for enhanced respect for both international humanitarian law and international human rights law, prioritizing protection of civilians in UN peace operations and preventing forced displacement of refugees and internally displaced persons (UN Secretary-General 2017b).

More recently, systems have evolved to focus specifically on the prevention of large-scale and deliberate attacks on civilians. Even when conflict prevention has failed or no means of stopping armed conflict are available, prevention of mass atrocities remains a priority. In 2001, following the tragedies of the Balkans (A/54/549) and Rwanda (S/199/1257), the UN Security Council invited the secretary-general “to refer to the Council information and analyses within the United Nations system on cases of serious violations of international law” and on “potential conflict situations” arising from “ethnic, religious, and territorial disputes” and other related issues (UN General Assembly 1999a, 1999b; UN Security Council 2001). In 2004, following this instruction, the UN secretary-general appointed the first special adviser on the prevention of genocide, followed in 2008 by appointment of the first special adviser on the responsibility to protect. In 2014, the Office of Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect released the first United Nations Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes (UN 2014).

This framework highlights that, like many other forms of violence, in most cases,
Given the dynamics of violent conflict today, there has been a resurgence of interest in expanding beyond early warning systems to more accurate forecasting of medium- to long-term conflict risks. Unlike early warning, forecasting relies on predictive capabilities of data monitoring tools and systems and is designed not to alert observers to impending violence, but to improve remote monitoring of underlying risks through data collection, multimethod and multidisciplinary research, adaption and revision of existing prediction models, and generation of policy-oriented analyses. Prediction models vary, not only in their accuracy in predicting the onset of violent conflict, but also in their precision in determining location, intensity, and time. While conventional approaches rely on statistical analyses of a country’s structural conditions, open-source information—that is, data from electronic news articles and web resources—is increasingly used for conflict risk assessment and near-time forecasting (Yi 2017c).

- The Political Instability Task Force, a macrostructural country-level forecasting model, has, for example, used a parsimonious selection of variables, focused on types of political regime and the existence of state-led exclusion to predict and explain large-scale violent conflict, destabilizing regime change, and genocide or politicide (Goldstone et al. 2010).
- Peace Research Institute Oslo has developed the Conflict Prediction Project to generate long-term simulation-based forecasts of armed conflict (Bosley 2016; Yi 2017c). Forecasting efforts have also been undertaken to identify risks of violence subnationally.
- In Liberia, for example, Blair, Blattman, and Hartman (2015) use 56 potential risk factors to predict locations of conflict, finding that ethnic diversity and polarization consistently predicted the location of violence over time. Another forecasting model using cross-sectional survey data in Liberia predicted up to 88 percent of actual local violence in 2012 and had an overall accuracy of 33–50 percent (Blair, Blattman, and Hartman 2011, 2015; Blattman 2012, 2014).a

The ability of qualitative sources to yield robust and policy-relevant predictions (Gibler 2016) is underscored in research that analyzed specialized newspaper content to predict political violence. News sources are not only available in real time, but also have strong country-specific elements. Therefore, by using topic models and focusing on within-country variation (or the timing of the occurrence of violence), researchers could predict accurately the onset of political violence one to two years before it occurred (Mueller and Rauh 2016).

Nevertheless, several different metricsb developed to evaluate predictive accuracy have shown that conflict forecasting still suffers from many limitations. Forecasting is most often based on complex models and is limited by technical and data issues—in particular, too many different variables are playing out in moving from risks to violence for simple modeling to provide a reliable basis for prediction.

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a. Using cross-sectional surveys of respondents in 242 small rural towns and villages in Liberia in 2008, 2010, and 2012, researchers focused on communal, extrajudicial, and criminal violence. The team used the 2008 data to predict local violence in 2010 and then generated predictions for 2012, while collecting new data to compare the predictions with the reality.

b. Point forecast evaluations such as mean absolute error, root mean squared error, and receiver operator characteristic curves are among the most widely used metrics to assess the performance of forecasting models. These metrics are often complemented by interval and density forecast evaluations such as prediction interval, probability integral transform, and continuous ranked probability score (Yi 2017b).
atrocity crimes are not unforeseen and “tend to occur in similar settings and share several elements or features” (UN 2014, 6). The framework highlights eight common risk factors for atrocities, including previous serious violations of international human rights law, the capacity to commit atrocity crimes, and concrete preparatory action. In addition to these common factors, the framework identifies six risk factors relevant specifically to the international crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. For example, crimes against humanity are often preceded by systematic attacks against specific civilian populations, and war crimes are often preceded by serious threats to humanitarian or peacekeeping operations. The framework also provides detailed indicators for assessing these risks.

**Preventive Diplomacy and Mediation**

Preventive diplomacy refers to early diplomatic action taken “to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts, and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur” (UN Secretary-General 1992, 3). The UN secretary-general, for example, plays an essential and personal role in preventive diplomacy through the provision of “good offices” to all parties. Mediation is a process whereby a third party assists two or more parties, with their consent, to prevent, manage, or resolve a conflict by helping them to develop mutually acceptable agreements.

Using confidence building and leverage, preventive diplomacy and mediation can play a role in altering the incentives of actors that propel societies toward violence. Given that diplomatic action can be mobilized quickly, when consent is present, it is often a tool of first resort in response to high risks of conflict and sometimes the only approach, short of military intervention, that can be deployed to avert violence (Fong and Day 2017). Mediation has also been used increasingly frequently. Greig and Diehl (2012) conclude that there were more mediation attempts during the 1990s (64 percent) than during the entire 1945–89 period, and this trend seems to have continued (Themmer and Wallensteen 2011).

Within the United Nations, the establishment of regional political offices—the UN Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS), the UN Office for Central Africa (UNOCA), and the UN Regional Center for Preventive Diplomacy in Central Asia (UNRCCA)—was a response to the increasing regionalization of conflict. Given their standing presence, ability to deploy, and relationships with most key stakeholders across the region, these regional offices offer alternatives to peacekeeping operations. In the Kyrgyz Republic, the EU, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), and UNRCCA responded to the 2010 crisis by focusing mainly on capacity building; tackling the rule of law; facilitating regional dialogues; especially around terrorism, water, and energy issues; and providing aid to displaced Uzbeks. This concerted effort enabled the government to end violence and commence a process of political reforms that led to parliamentary elections (Call 2012). Another example is the response of the UN Office for West Africa (UNOWA) to the crisis in Guinea in 2008 following the death of President Lansana Conté and the takeover of the country by a military junta. With the mediation of the head of UNOWA, Special Representative of the Secretary-General Said Djinnit, and ECOWAS, the situation was diffused. UNOWA subsequently provided expertise on conflict prevention, mediation, and security sector reform, which helped the country to hold successful national elections at the end of 2010.

Mediation is increasingly conducted by a range of organizations, including cadres of experienced envoys or mediators from the UN, regional and subregional organizations, individual states, and nongovernmental actors (box 7.6; Svensson and Lundgren 2015). In a study undertaken using Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) data between 1989 and 2013, states were found to be the principal mediators in 59 percent of cases, while intergovernmental organizations were
BOX 7.6 Multiple-Actor Mediation

Bilateral, subregional, and regional organizations and the United Nations often seek to work in tandem, rather than in parallel, to bring the legitimacy and weight of their respective bodies to bear in coordinated efforts. These efforts include other international and regional organizations as well as nongovernmental actors (in so-called track 2 approaches) and national actors (individual local mediators as well as civil society groups, for example, youth and women’s groups). This collaboration has led to efforts to increase coordination at the international and national levels. At the country level, it has led to broader and more inclusive mediation approaches, including organization of national dialogue initiatives.

- In Kenya in 2008, Kofi Annan, former UN secretary-general, mediated the end of postelection ethnic violence on behalf of the Panel of Eminent African Personalities of the African Union, with technical support provided by experts from the United Nations and the nongovernmental Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (Crocker and Aall 1999; Lanz and Gasser 2013; Lindenmayer and Kaye 2009).
- In the Kyrgyz Republic in 2010, after President Kurmanbek Bakiev’s ouster, a triple mediation initiative of the EU, the OSCE, and the United Nations provided considerable leverage and legitimacy to the effort to ensure stability during the transition (Call 2012).
- In Guinea in 2009–10, the African Union, the International Contact Group, and the United Nations supported the ECOWAS-led mediation that persuaded a military junta to support a transition to civilian rule and constitutional order (Mancini 2011).
- In Colombia, the Cuban and Norwegian governments facilitated the peace agreement between the government of Colombia and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) rebels, with technical assistance on thematic agreements and confidence building provided by various UN entities and other actors (Aguirre 2015).  

The broadening of the mediation environment (in terms of both mediators and parties) has improved the responsiveness and mobilization of international actors and facilitated broader ownership of peace processes. In The Gambia, for example, the national government, African Union, ECOWAS, the EU, Nigeria, and the United Nations played a decisive role in preventing violence and enabling a peaceful transition of power to the elected president, Adama Barrow. However, the growing number of stakeholders has also made the management of mediation more complex, increasing the need for coordination, leadership, and unified approaches to prevent confusion and efforts from working at cross-purposes to each other.


principal mediators in 30 percent of cases. Private individuals and nongovernmental organizations such as the Geneva-based Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, the Helsinki-based Crisis Management Initiative, or the Community of Sant’Egidio in Rome were the principal mediators in 11 percent of cases reported in the press (Svensson and Onken 2015). In many processes, multiple mediators may be engaged, at times in a coordinated fashion in support of a lead mediator, at other times working at cross-purposes (Whitfield 2010).

The growing body of practice in preventive diplomacy has translated into stronger institutional frameworks supporting such actions. At the international level, groupings of member states and international organizations supporting the prevention
or resolution of conflicts and leveraging financial and other resources, known variously as “groups of friends,” “contact groups,” and “core groups,” grew from 4 to more than 30 between 1990 and 2009 (Whitfield 2010). At the same time, in some prominent cases—the Syrian Arab Republic most obviously, but also Libya and the Republic of Yemen—the breadth and complexity of the conflict and the multiplicity of actors involved have defied long-standing efforts to secure lasting political settlements.

Assessing the effectiveness of diplomacy and mediation faces inherent challenges, since it is hard to isolate the effects of such efforts from the conduct of the conflict, the parties, and other external actors. Data suggest that, while diplomatic engagement is the most common form of international recourse in violent conflict, evidence of its ability to halt the outbreak of conflict is mixed. What is clearer is that mediation alone is insufficient to resolve underlying causes of violence. While mediators have the potential to help to generate settlement deals that can bring short-term stability, these deals are fragile and more likely to break down than military victories (Hoeffler 2014; Svensson and Lundgren 2015). Qualitative case studies show that diplomacy, which at its core relies on the “wisdom and appeal of its arguments” (Hinnebusch et al. 2016, 4), has helped to avert or end violence in specific cases, but that, even when successful, mediation and elite settlements often provide breathing space rather than long-term solutions (Fong and Day 2017).

These findings, however, require careful analysis of the definition of success. A study using the International Crisis Behavior data set of interstate war finds that, in cases of conflict relapse after mediated settlement between 1945 and 2005, violence was often reduced in the first years after relapse. Furthermore, when negotiated settlements are combined with third-party security guarantees, such settlements extended the duration of peace (Hoeffler 2014; Walter 2017). In sum, diplomatic action can provide the framework for proposing measures that, if implemented, can consolidate peace. When preventive diplomacy and mediation lead to settlements, they can provide much-needed space for other forms of action that address the underlying causes of violence. How diplomatic and other forms of engagements could work together is explored in more detail later in this chapter.

Despite these findings, preventive diplomacy and mediation face important challenges, including both the identification of entry points and the characteristics of the conflicts to be mediated. States can be sensitive to the engagement of outsiders in what are perceived as internal responsibilities. Preventive diplomacy also suffers from a bias toward the national level and underuse of dialogue processes at the subnational level that involve local actors, including trusted mediators (Harland 2016). In addition, international third-party contributions tend to come once a pathway to violence has been set and deviation from the path is more difficult.

### Preventing Violent Extremism

There is a strong consensus on behalf of many national governments and multilateral organizations, including the UN General Assembly, the UN Security Council, and the World Bank, that violent extremism has reached a level of threat and sophistication that requires a comprehensive approach encompassing not only military or security measures, but also preventive measures that directly address development, good governance, human rights, and humanitarian concerns (Rosand 2016; UNDP 2017). Accordingly, the United Nations has developed an overarching Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism (A/70/674), reinforcing the first pillar of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (A/RES/60/288), which focuses on addressing the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism (UN General Assembly 2006b; UN Secretary-General 2016a).
The Plan of Action recognizes that the risk of violent extremism often increases under the same conditions that lead to heightened risk of conflict and provides entry points for national and international actors to address key drivers of extremist violence. Where violent conflict exists, efforts must be redoubled to promote and sustain dialogue between warring parties, since persistent, unresolved conflict has proved to be a major driver of violent extremism (ICG 2016). Therefore, the first of the seven strategic priority areas consists of dialogue and conflict prevention.

The UN General Assembly, in Resolution 70/291 adopted on July 1, 2016, recommends that member states implement recommendations from the Plan of Action, as relevant to each national context (UN General Assembly 2016b; UN Secretary-General 2016a). It also invites member states, together with regional and subregional organizations, to develop national and regional plans of action to prevent violent extremism. As discussed in chapter 6, a growing number of member states and regional and subregional organizations are now developing national and regional plans to address the drivers of violent extremism, drawing on the UN Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism, and are requesting UN support in their efforts. A High-Level Prevent Violent Extremism Action Group, chaired by the secretary-general and consisting of the heads of 21 UN agencies, funds, and programs, is taking the lead in implementing the Plan of Action in support of member states, at their request.

Peace Operations

Although not explicitly envisioned in the UN Charter, peace operations remain one of the most widely known international tools for prevention and have evolved significantly since 1990, from a narrow focus on monitoring cease-fires and peace agreements to complex multidimensional missions with mandates to consolidate peace, prevent relapse into conflict, and support the restoration of state authority. While rarely deployed to avert the outbreak of violence, mandates today range from building institutions and facilitating peaceful dialogue to protecting civilians and upholding human rights (DPKO 2008).

Since 1945, most such deployments have been peacekeeping operations or special political missions led by the United Nations, although regional and subregional missions fielded by the African Union and ECOWAS and multinational forces with Security Council authorization have become increasingly common. Peacekeeping roles have ranged from the “classic” model of interposing forces and monitoring cease-fires all the way to conducting robust, peace enforcement operations with rules of engagement entailing the use of force. As of mid-2017, 16 peacekeeping operations are deployed (figure 7.1), comprising approximately 94,000 uniformed personnel and 15,000 civilian personnel and lasting on average three times longer than operations prior to 2000 (UN 2015, 4). The United Nation’s special political missions, meanwhile—considered as “operations whose principal mandate is ‘political’” (Johnstone 2010)—have steadily increased in the past two decades. While only 3 political missions were active in 1993, 21 were active in 2017, with more than 3,000 personnel. Both peacekeeping and political missions have evolved considerably over time to support conflict prevention, mediation, and management across all phases of conflict (that is, from situations of active conflict to immediate postconflict and longer-term peacebuilding phases).

Most quantitative studies, drawing on different statistical models and definitions of peacekeeping, conclude that peace operations have a large and statistically significant impact on fostering the negotiated resolution of civil wars, preventing the escalation of violence against civilians, and preventing the recurrence of violence (Doyle and Sambanis 2000, 2006; Fortna 2004; Gilligan and Sergenti 2008; Hartzell, Hoddie, and Rothchild 2001; Walter 1997, 2017). Evidence also suggests that peace operations can prevent the spread of
Conflict within a country once violence has broken out.25 These studies have been reinforced by analyzing different types of peace operations. For example, Collier and Rohner (2008), analyzing the correlation between peacekeeping expenditure and risks of recurrence of violent conflict, and Doyle and Sambanis (2000), considering different types of operations and the probability of peace breaking down within two years, have shown that robust mandates and larger missions in terms of budget and troop strength appear to perform better in preventing relapse into civil war (Beardsley 2011; Doyle and Sambanis 2000, 2006; Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon 2013). Qualitatively, the successes of peacekeeping are numerous, including Bosnia and Herzegovina, El Salvador, Kosovo,26 Mozambique, Namibia, Nicaragua, and, more recently, Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Timor-Leste.

The preventive value of these actions lies precisely in the creation of disincentives for the use of violence (box 7.7). As the complexity of conflicts has grown, however, multidimensional missions have increasingly been tasked with establishing institutional mechanisms for peacefully managing differences and disputes.27 Both peacekeeping and political missions are, as a result, increasingly providing comprehensive support across areas as diverse as human rights, the rule of law, sexual violence in conflict, violent extremism, organized crime and drug trafficking, security sector reform, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, and mine action.28

As highlighted in the 2015 report of the High-Level Independent Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, peace operations are increasingly deployed in protracted and complex conflicts, with peacekeepers and political officers operating in remote, unstable, and often dangerous environments (UN 2015). In these contexts, peace operations must actively engage in conflict prevention and management where there is no clear “peace to keep” or in unstable post-conflict contexts characterized by fragile peace settlements, weak institutions, and high risk of future conflict. Peace operations in these environments play a role in (a) preventing the continuation of violence following a cease-fire or peace agreement and (b) preventing or managing new forms of conflicts and crises (outbreak, escalation,
reocurrence). From the military side, this involvement has led to major changes in the rules of engagement and use of force, which have expanded to include the protection of civilians and the maintenance of access for providing humanitarian assistance, more robust engagement and use of force against armed actors, and capacity building of security forces.

These new circumstances have extended the duration of peacekeeping operations and increased the scale of operations required both to mitigate the impact of immediate violence and to reduce the risk of reoccurrence (box 7.8). While peace operations have prevented regional spillovers and supported postconflict transitions in many countries, they have been mandated to undertake tasks beyond their military and financial capabilities and often run the risk of overstretch. Some countries have experienced escalation of subnational conflict in spite of the deployment of large peacekeeping operations, such as the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and South Sudan.

Taken together, the international system has developed tools designed to engage in preventive action across different phases of risk from outbreak to risk of continuation and relapse. Furthermore, the evidence shows that the various international tools and core functions have worked in specific circumstances. EWSs have provided short-term warning of impending violence, increased diplomatic efforts have secured settlements to conflict and reduced the risk of outbreaks, and peace operations have reduced spillover, escalation, and continuation of violence. Evidence also suggests that these tools have achieved greatest impact when deployed in a coordinated manner after the outbreak of violence (Hoeffler 2014), for example, when using mediation to encourage a cease-fire or technical support to reinforce policy reforms.

However, current trends are testing the limits of the existing tools, and the international system is struggling to adapt. For example, recent UN reviews highlighting the “primacy of politics” in guiding UN operations point to a more concerted need to address the underlying causes of conflict across multiple levels. Chapter 8 discusses recommendations for their adaptation and application in more detail.
International Development Assistance

International development assistance has long been a cornerstone of the international community’s endeavors to create a peaceful and prosperous world. UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s report on conflict prevention in 2001 highlighted that “one of the principal aims of preventive action should be to address the deep-rooted socioeconomic, cultural, environmental,
in institutional, and other structural causes that often underlie the immediate political symptoms of conflicts” (UN Secretary-General 2001, 2).

Development assistance has increased steadily over the past 60 years and is increasingly targeted at conflict-affected and fragile contexts. Where it is aligned with an understanding of conflict dynamics, aid is a very important mechanism to support national and local capacities to build pathways toward peace. This is especially the case when aid can be designed to address early risks of violent conflicts. Recent international commitments on aid, such as the Paris Declaration (2005), the Accra Action Agenda (2008), and the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States (2011), have recognized the role of development aid in peacebuilding.

Over the past decade, the development focus among important bilateral and multilateral agencies has started to shift toward supporting national institutions and actors in conflict prevention. However, despite calls for greater investment in prevention (OECD 2015; World Bank 2011), most aid is still delivered after violence has occurred, and aid flows to fragile and postconflict settings tend to be unpredictable and inconsistent. Development aid is still not commonly viewed as a relevant tool for early prevention, and policies that stimulate growth and poverty reduction often are assumed to be sufficient in and of themselves to reduce the risk of violence.

In addition, international development actors and multilateral development banks, in particular, are still highly constrained from engaging on sensitive issues with governments by their mandates, institutional makeup, and internal culture. At early signs of risk and in precrisis contexts, these constraints often limit the scope for development programming to address causes of tension and sensitive areas such as security and justice. Aid for prevention also tends to be fragmented, short term, and seen as a complement to rather than an integral part of development efforts.

The Relationship between Aid and Conflict

The question of whether development assistance helps to prevent or fuel violent conflict has been a matter of debate for decades. Three main theories, discussed in chapter 3, have guided research in this area. Some (Cali and Mulabdic 2017; Dube and Vargas 2013) argue for a “rapacity effect,” whereby aid essentially creates an incentive for violence because there are more resources to fight over. For example, Nunn and Qian (2014) find a positive effect of U.S. food aid on the incidence and duration of conflict. Collier and Hoeffler (2004) and Dal Bo and Dal Bo (2011) counter that increasing the available resources (through aid or other measures) creates a disincentive for violence by raising the opportunity cost, especially if resources are allocated in a way that raises wages or redistributes them to would-be combatants.

A growing body of research suggests that the degree to which an increase in aid could fuel conflict depends on the extent to which the aid is fungible and the way the state uses it (Collier and Hoeffler 2006; Langlotz and Potrafke 2016). In particular, country-level aid, especially budget support, is sometimes seen as being much more political and therefore conflict-inducing than project-level aid, precisely because it allows a great deal of autonomy over use of the aid (Gehring, Kaplan, and Wong 2017). However, for governments that have a sound prevention strategy, budgetary support can be essential to providing the fiscal space and capability to implement their prevention strategy in a comprehensive way. A project-by-project approach can be unmanageable and lead to fragmentation.

The use of aid is critical, as is the relevance of the strategy that frames its delivery. If part of the budget support is channeled toward military spending, it could contribute to a decrease in violence if it effectively deters opposing groups from using violence. However, if the increased military funding is channeled toward more repressive measures seen as illegitimate by the population, it can have the opposite effect.
Aid at the project level is viewed as less political, although certainly not conflict-neutral. Aid projects that provide basic goods (food, water) or improve service delivery can have different effects depending on how the aid is used and what kind of aid it is. Aid that goes to individual projects can contribute to increased violence if rebel groups are able to appropriate and use it as an incentive for recruitment, or it can reduce violence if it helps to boost incomes and relieve economic stresses in conflict-affected regions (M. B. Anderson 1999; Fearon and Laitin 2003).

Because aid is part and parcel of the local context, differential benefits from aid can reinforce intergroup tensions and fuel divisive narratives of “us” versus “them” (M. B. Anderson 1999; Jenny 2017). Moreover, aid can reinforce grievances along identity lines when it lacks impartiality or when it is perceived as biased in favor of specific groups irrespective of their need for assistance (Carbonnier 2015). An OECD (2010) report on monitoring the principles for good international engagement in fragile states and situations highlights the uneven distribution of aid resources as problematic in five of the six countries reviewed (Afghanistan, the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Haiti, and Timor-Leste). In Timor-Leste, for example, the “Dili-centric” development efforts were thought to worsen the urban-rural divide and contribute to pockets of exclusion (OECD 2010).

Aid can also create a substitution effect when an action takes over local capacity and reduces or replaces local efforts. This can have negative impacts by reducing the legitimacy of existing structures or authorities. For example, a dual or parallel public sector can detract from important state- and peacebuilding processes that are necessary for the country to earn legitimacy in the eyes of its constituents. Aid also can affect the local market, reinforce market distortions by feeding the war economy, and undermine peacetime production (Kang 2017).

Finally, aligning priorities for development aid can be difficult, depending on when crisis breaks out. For example, there could be political difficulties in realigning development aid in precrisis contexts or the often-dramatic reprioritization of aid that occurs when crisis breaks out (with emphasis placed on security or humanitarian expenditures). Even more worrisome are the disruptions of standard procedures in development coordination that occur when a crisis breaks.

Because of these potential negative impacts, linking the delivery of aid to do-no-harm measures is essential to help donors be sensitive to the specific contexts in which they operate. This process includes identifying issues, elements, or factors that divide societies as well as local capacity for peace that brings societies together. It also requires donors to consider what aid will do for whom, who are the responsible actors and stakeholders, and who has access to aid (Wallace 2015). A study conducted at the end of the five-year pilot phase of the New Deal took stock of how bilateral and multilateral donors have conceptualized and implemented their commitment to promote “inclusive and legitimate politics” (INCAF 2017). On the basis of empirical evidence acquired through case studies in four G-7+ pilot countries (Afghanistan, Somalia, South Sudan, and Timor-Leste), the study finds that, at best, donors work with an incomplete and inadequate understanding of the typically fragmented and contested politics of fragile societies beyond the formal representatives of their governments and administrations (INCAF 2017). The study also finds that, in response to perceived or real deficits in governance with regard to legitimacy or inclusivity, donors tend to offer standardized packages of political support that focus on the technical and procedural aspects of an idealized democracy (for example, pressuring national stakeholders to hold national elections as soon as possible after a political settlement) rather than on realities on the ground.

Overall, aid brings positive results when it is delivered with meaningful engagement with government and civil society. As described in chapter 6, civil society plays a critical role in conflict prevention. Donors have supported local peace committees
and various conflict resolution platforms, including in postconflict situations. For such programs, civil society has proven to be an indispensable interlocutor, facilitator, and mediator, particularly in cases in which political corruption, organized crime, and dysfunctional state institutions are major issues. Donor-funded community-based conflict resolution has proved critical in various contexts, including Ghana, the Kyrgyz Republic, and Lesotho (Giessmann, Galvanek, and Seifert 2017). This involvement entails risks: when development aid is channeled primarily through nongovernmental organizations, it can undermine the state’s capacity to play a central role in prevention.

A critical element of enhancing the impact of aid on peace is connecting aid from both development and security actors to national processes of prioritization. The New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States (box 7.9) provides a guiding framework for this connection. It emerged from the 2007 Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations, which sought to translate established principles of aid effectiveness—as per the Paris Declaration of 2005—to contexts of fragility and conflict. These initiatives and others are supported by bodies such as the International Network on Conflict and Fragility, established in 2009 by the Development Assistance Committee to enable its members to develop similar frameworks.

International actors are supporting national prioritization and planning processes in a growing number of countries. This can include support for national dialogues (box 7.10) as well as consultative processes to develop conflict and fragility assessments. Two relevant examples are the UN’s conflict and development analysis and the World Bank’s risk and resilience assessments, which inform programming.

Multistakeholder analytical and coordination platforms are increasingly being used to improve alignment of aid flows among multiple partners with identified conflict and peacebuilding priorities. Recovery and Peacebuilding Assessments (RPBAs), for instance, are assessments supported by the EU, the United Nations, and the World Bank to support countries in the development of holistic strategies for addressing the political, security, and development priorities related to stabilization and peacebuilding (box 7.11).

### Supporting Peaceful Pathways with Development Assistance

As discussed in chapter 3, the path dependence of violence and of peace means that, as risks accumulate and intensify, the options for preventing violence become scarcer and more difficult to take. Because aid is channeled through national governments, international actors also experience this dynamic in supporting national processes; in higher-risk contexts, a smaller range of tools are applicable and feasible. To increase effectiveness, aid needs to be targeted sufficiently on supporting prevention policies and programs when early signs of risk appear and flexible enough to adapt as risks change. This targeting has proven difficult in the past, not least because it requires having a frank and engaged

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**BOX 7.9 The New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States**

The New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States emerged from the recognition that ensuring effective development assistance requires a common international framework for all countries tackling the challenge of conflict and fragility. The New Deal is a global policy agreement formed with guidance from the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding, which comprises conflict-affected and fragile countries, civil society, and international partners. It has been endorsed by more than 40 countries and organizations since 2011.
**BOX 7.10 United Nations–World Bank Partnership in the Republic of Yemen**

During the Republic of Yemen’s post-2011 Arab Spring period, the World Bank provided technical assistance to the government in support of the country’s transition, including advice on implementation of the Yemeni National Dialogue process. In 2014 the Bank seconded a staff member to the Office of the Special Advisor to the UN Secretary-General on the Republic of Yemen to optimize the support of both institutions for implementation of the National Dialogue outcomes. When the Republic of Yemen’s military conflict fully erupted in 2015, the United Nations and the World Bank agreed to align the political mediation process with economic recovery through the development of initiatives that interwove political and economic elements.

Despite suspension of its preconflict portfolio, the World Bank maintained its engagement with the Republic of Yemen during the conflict, preserving critical local service delivery institutions and providing inclusive emergency support to conflict-affected vulnerable Yemenis. The current International Development Association (IDA) portfolio of more than US$1 billion is being implemented in full partnership with selected United Nations partners that have presence on the ground and can work closely with Yemeni institutions to provide critical support in sectors such as health, nutrition, water, social protection, and urban services. The World Bank is also preparing for postconflict recovery and reconstruction, paying due attention to state and institution building and laying the foundation for a more inclusive and resilient Republic of Yemen.

The partnership between the United Nations and the World Bank has been institutionalized through a Yemen Humanitarian-Development-Peace Program that brings together joint and shared data across the humanitarian-development-peace spectrum and contributes to a common understanding of risks, needs, gaps, and opportunities.

**BOX 7.11 Recovery and Peacebuilding Assessment in the Central African Republic**

The Central African Republic RPBA aimed to help the new government to promote peace and prevent a relapse of conflict following presidential elections in early 2016. The assessment was firmly grounded in a shared understanding of the conflict, building on a World Bank risk and resilience assessment, which informed the RPBA’s conflict analysis and the UN’s strategic assessment mission. It supported the planning for the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) operations. The joint EU, UN, World Bank scoping mission to Bangui in May 2016 met with the government, the international community, civil society, and the private sector. The findings of the conflict analysis were shared with the government and were used to define shared strategic objectives across development, peace, and security pillars.

The RPBA was innovative in its integration of the views of the population, gathered in a survey conducted in all 179 communes and through interviews with local authorities on local infrastructure and security and policy priorities. The survey collected information on household socioeconomic well-being, perceptions of security and economic conditions, and opinions on policy priorities. The assessment reached more than 14,000 people across the country, resulting in a national plan that

(Box continued next page)
discussion with governments on issues of risk of violence that both sides too often perceive as being outside the realm of development efforts.30

A more formidable challenge arises when the state is the source of violence or a major obstacle to peace. In these situations, international actors are left with few options. They can halt aid entirely or confine it to priority regions or essential services, with the risk that doing so could reinforce divisions or give groups no alternative but to seek the support of the state. Conditioning aid on a change in course by the state is another option, but doing so can generate risks similar to the impacts of sanctions and has not proven effective in the recent past. Working through nonstate actors is another option, but this too risks ultimately undermining the state or increasing the vulnerability of those actors to state retaliation.

Finding ways to support national actors in changing course toward prevention, when incentives are strongly aligned against it, requires a level of coordination and sensitivity to local dynamics that is rarely seen. Calls for better coordination are consistently made, agreed on, and later ignored. In many cases, rather than enhancing coordination and efficiency, large-scale external aid has produced fragmentation, confronting government partners with thousands of projects, many of them short term, and parallel governance and fiduciary systems (Institute for State Effectiveness 2018). At the heart of this failure is a misalignment of incentives within both multilateral and national institutions.

**Allocation of Official Development Assistance**

Official development assistance (ODA), as an external financial flow—along with foreign direct investment, remittances, and lending—is vital to countries with limited capacity to raise domestic resources, including countries affected by conflict.31

In response to the increasingly complex challenges faced by many low- and middle-income countries, ODA—comprising concessional financing from donor governments to both governments and multilateral institutions—has been growing steadily, quadrupling since 1960 in real terms (OECD 2017).32 Since 2000, the rate of increase has accelerated, with ODA measured in real terms (in constant 2015 prices and exchange rates) more than doubling between 2000 and 2016 from US$70.85 billion to US$143.3 billion, with a nearly 50 percent increase from 2007 to 2016 alone (OECD 2017).33 The share of...
ODA going to multilateral institutions has increased, while bilateral aid has decreased slightly (falling by 5 percent from 2015). As a result, multilateral aid is now roughly equal to bilateral aid (Development Assistance Committee 2017).

The rise in ODA has been boosted by an increase in humanitarian aid, particularly in response to the refugee crisis (box 7.12). Humanitarian aid increased by 8 percent between 2015 and 2016 in real terms, reaching US$14.4 billion. Still, humanitarian aid remains a small portion of overall ODA, only about 10 percent in 2016 (Development Assistance Committee 2017). In addition, ODA spent by donor countries to cover the costs of hosting refugees surged by 27.5 percent to US$15.4 billion between 2015 and 2016, representing roughly 10.8 percent of ODA (Development Assistance Committee 2017).

The largest share of ODA is directed toward countries considered fragile or conflict-affected, where other sources of financing, especially foreign direct investment, tend to be more limited. During 2011–14, 14 of the top 20 ODA recipients were considered fragile, according to the OECD framework (OECD 2016), and overall net ODA flows to fragile states increased by around 140 percent in real terms from 2000 to 2015 (Dugarova and Gulasan 2017). Across fragile contexts, ODA tends to concentrate in a handful of countries. For instance, between 2003 and 2012, Afghanistan and Iraq received 22 percent of all ODA allocated to fragile contexts (OECD 2015). In per capita terms, 34 of 56 fragile

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**BOX 7.12 Humanitarian Assistance**

The primary purpose of humanitarian assistance is to save lives, reduce suffering, and maintain human dignity. Since 2013, approximately 97 percent of humanitarian crises have been “complex emergencies,” meaning that they are multifaceted humanitarian crises requiring multisectoral response (UNOCHA 2016). With humanitarian appeals lasting an average of seven years, humanitarian actors have been present in many crises for more than two decades, for example, in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Somalia, and Sudan (UNOCHA 2015).

As highlighted by the World Humanitarian Summit, this funding is unsustainable. Financing requirements for the UN-coordinated humanitarian appeals and refugee response plans increased significantly from US$5.2 billion in 2006 to US$22.1 billion in 2016 (UN 2017). Whereas humanitarian aid also increased from US$3.4 billion to US$12.6 billion during the same period, it increasingly falls short of needs, and only 56 percent of the UN appeals were met in 2016 (UN 2017).

Providing humanitarian aid and meeting international commitments to refugees are important responsibilities of countries, and in the absence of successful prevention of conflicts and disaster risk reduction, it is essential to mitigate the impact of conflict on the most vulnerable. Since the World Humanitarian Summit in 2016, important efforts have been under way to integrate the provision of humanitarian and development assistance more tightly, recognizing the need to respond simultaneously to life-saving needs, strengthen economic and social resilience, and, where possible, promote peacebuilding in conflict contexts. The World Humanitarian Summit resulted in important commitments in this regard, with member states and international organizations committing to improve joint planning and aid predictability and to ensure seamless transitions between humanitarian and development assistance. The summit secured, above everything else, key commitments to prevent and end conflicts and leave no one behind. Building on the summit, the World Bank and the United Nations have committed to “engaging earlier to prevent violent conflict and reduce humanitarian need” (World Bank 2017).
contexts attracted less than the average ODA per capita that the group as a whole received between 2011 and 2014—among them, 17 fragile contexts received less than half the average level (OECD 2016). The extent of aid dependency also varies significantly within the group. During the same period, the average aid dependency among fragile contexts was 10.5 percent of gross national income (GNI), compared with 2.5 percent of GNI for stable contexts; in Afghanistan, Liberia, and the Solomon Islands, it was around or above 30 percent (OECD 2016).

Despite strong arguments for increasing aid flows before violence takes hold (OECD 2015; World Bank 2011), most aid focuses on postcrisis situations. While humanitarian aid tends to spike during and immediately after conflict, development assistance, which represents the bulk of ODA, is most often disbursed only after violence has occurred and declines very rapidly (see, example, figure 7.2).

Aid volatility poses another set of challenges, especially for countries recovering from violent conflict. According to a report by the Brookings Institution, during the period 2007–14 aid volatility in fragile and conflict-affected settings was 7 percentage points higher and donors performed 10 percentage points fewer of their activities jointly with other donors than in other contexts (Chandy, Seidal, and Zhang 2016). It has been argued that in high-risk contexts, volatile aid risks amplifying countries’ internal instability (Chandy, Seidel, and Zhang 2016) and constrains the capacity for postconflict recovery. In many protracted conflicts, this volatility in the volume of aid can be exacerbated by sudden diversion of aid from developmental or institutional development to humanitarian service delivery, and back, as countries undergo repeated cycles of violence (Carver 2017). As the example of the Central African Republic (box 7.13) illustrates, unpredictable aid flows are creating major constraints on efforts to prevent the relapse of violent conflicts. Collier and Rohner (2008), noting the negative effects that violent conflict inflicts on a country’s institutions and capacity, argue that aid flows would be much more productive if sustained over time, as countries rebuild institutions.

FIGURE 7.2 Aid Inflows (2002–15) and Conflict-Related Fatalities (2000–16) in the Democratic Republic of Congo

Sources: OECD Statistics; Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED) database; Yi 2017.
Note: DAC = OECD Development Assistance Committee.
Areas of Convergence between Diplomatic, Security, and Development Instruments

With violent conflict increasingly operating outside of state-based frameworks and the need for prevention to move beyond single actions and toward sustained engagement, no single policy realm is adequate to manage the risks of conflict (Griffin, forthcoming). Instead, successful conflict prevention strategies increasingly need to align security, development, and diplomatic action over the long term.

Recognizing the potential impact of more coordinated responses, diplomatic, security, and development actors increasingly seek to bridge divides and find areas of convergence between international tools in order to harness more coordinated action for prevention. This has been facilitated by the development of institutional platforms for interagency coordination and resource pooling. The UN Peacebuilding Commission and Peacebuilding Fund have played a strategic role in fostering greater coordination between peacekeeping and development actors and ensuring financial resources for integrated programs (box 7.14). This has been notably the case in Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Sierra Leone, where support of the Peacebuilding Commission and Peacebuilding Fund has enabled peace consolidation and postconflict transition processes. Collaboration has also gone beyond UN development agencies to include partnerships with other multilateral development organizations, including the World Bank.

The evolution of both practice and policy points to some critical areas of convergence among security, development, and diplomatic action. This section

**BOX 7.13 Aid Volatility in the Central African Republic**

The Central African Republic has been on the “fragile states” list of the OECD every year since the first year it was published in 2007. In 2013 the OECD identified the country as being potentially underaided—an “aid orphan”—according to two needs-based models using income per capita and population size as parameters.

In reality, however, the Central African Republic has been the recipient of often large, but extremely volatile, support. In 1998 a UN peacekeeping operation was deployed in the context of army mutinies and in the midst of controversial electoral preparations with a mission budget of approximately US$200 million in 2018 dollars. This mission was replaced on January 1, 2000, by a “peacebuilding office” with a budget 100 times smaller—approximately US$2 million.

At the same time, total flows of ODA to the country have been small. On average, the Central African Republic received US$286 million per year during the period 2002–14, amounting to US$65 per capita. The average, however, is biased upward by two large aid allocations: US$760 million in debt relief in 2009 and US$270 million in emergency relief in 2014.

Over the same period, ODA allocations to the first three Peacebuilding and State-building Goals of the New Deal on political, security, and justice institutions amounted to only US$3 per capita and an even more paltry US$1.4 per capita for 2002–05, immediately after withdrawal of the peacekeeping operation. Total ODA allocated to goals 1–3 amounted to only US$180 million over the 12-year period between 2002 and 2014.

Following the escalation of violence in 2013–14, a peacekeeping mission with more than 12,500 uniformed personnel and an annual operating budget of US$920 million was deployed, with US$2.2 billion of ODA pledged to support peacebuilding and recovery.

discusses how this convergence has contributed to the prevention of violent conflict over the long term.

**Preconflict Mediation**

Development actors have a standing presence in almost all countries at risk of conflict and maintain well-established relationships and contacts with a wide range of national actors. In some cases, development planning and assessments have been used to inform possible mediation planning, and development operations have directly undertaken or supported early mediation efforts. These efforts are particularly useful for addressing subnational disputes or latent tensions. A good example of this work is the Joint United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)—Department of Political Affairs Program on Building National Capacities for Conflict Resolution.
Prevention, which has supported conflict analysis and early mediation efforts in countries including Chad and Kenya and has engaged national governments to build the capacity to address conflict risks (UNDP and Department of Political Affairs 2016).

Support for Postconflict Peacebuilding

Peace operations—particularly in contexts with tenuous or no peace agreements—increasingly have mandates to support the creation of a political, security, institutional, and economic environment conducive to peacemaking and longer-term peacebuilding.36 In some countries, this has required technical advisory and development assistance across a range of thematic areas, including restoration of state authority, security and justice sector reform, disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR), and economic recovery, among others (box 7.15). Peace operations and development agencies have developed joint strategic frameworks to support multidimensional stabilization efforts, which have combined military, police, and civilian capacities and resources with development programming and financing to support improved security conditions and institutional capacities. Experience shows the importance of “bottom-up,” community-driven conflict mitigation strategies with inclusive approaches to defining, reestablishing, and reforming institutions of governance and economic recovery strategies predicated on addressing inequality and exclusion.37 This evolving approach to stabilization, which has

**BOX 7.15 Iraq’s Facility for Stabilization**

At the request of the Iraqi prime minister, UNDP established the Funding Facility for Stabilization (FFS) in June 2015 to help the government stabilize cities and districts liberated from the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). The FFS is designed to help safeguard against the resurgence of violence and extremism, facilitate returns, and lay the groundwork for reconstruction and recovery.

FFS is an on-demand instrument overseen by a steering committee chaired by the secretary-general of the Iraqi Council of Ministers. Stabilization priorities are set by the Iraqi authorities who are directly responsible for stabilizing areas. As soon as a newly liberated area is declared safe and local authorities have identified priorities, UNDP uses fast-track procedures to bring local contractors on the ground, usually within weeks.

More than 95 percent of all stabilization projects are done through the local private sector employing local labor. This approach is highly effective, helping to inject liquidity into the local economy, generate local jobs, and reduce overall costs.

Nearly 1,550 projects are currently under way in 28 liberated towns in Anbar, Diyala, Nineveh, and Salah al Din governorates. More than half involve rehabilitation of electricity, water, and sewage grids. Rather than starting at the top of the grid and forcing families to wait for services, sometimes for years, households are being connected to the nearest functioning component of the grid.

Bridges, schools, health centers, pharmacies, hospitals, universities, and administrative buildings are being repaired, and thousands of people are employed on work crews, removing rubble and transporting debris. Destitute families, including women-headed households, are benefiting from cash grants, and thousands of houses are being rebuilt in destroyed neighborhoods.

The impact has been significant; half of the nearly 6 million Iraqis who were displaced during the fighting have returned to their homes and started to rebuild their lives.

been articulated operationally in the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Mali, attempts to provide a long-term commitment to reducing violence by identifying and managing the drivers of conflict alongside political negotiations.

**Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration and Community-Based Conflict Management**

A core element of postconflict peacebuilding is the DDR of combatants. The United Nations, the World Bank, and other international organizations have been effective at monitoring and supporting demobilization and disarmament processes. When it comes to reintegration, however, their record is mixed (Berdal and Ucko 2009; Weinstein and Humphreys 2005). The current decade has seen heightened political and security challenges in settings where peace operations deploy (for example, no peace agreement or inclusive political process, transnational criminal networks, a rising number of armed nonstate actors, violent extremism, or regional armed group dynamics), making DDR more challenging to achieve (Colletta and Muggah 2009; Muggah 2010). Nonetheless, the Security Council continues to mandate DDR in situations of protracted conflicts, violent extremism, and generalized criminal violence.

One of the emerging challenges facing development, security, and diplomatic operations alike is the presence of organized armed groups and criminal gangs, often rooted in unsuccessfully reintegrated combatants. While these groups are usually small, they can create local conflicts that can rapidly escalate to the national level.

International partners, particularly peace operations, are increasingly working with national governments in formulating bottom-up, nonmilitary preventive “community engagement strategies.” These initiatives may complement formal peace agreements and include approaches such as community violence reduction programs or community stabilization projects. These strategies are focused on “localizing” services in arenas of contestation, through protection of civilians, mitigation of intercommunal conflicts, and community violence reduction actions, while at the same time restoring state authority in sensitive areas. These initiatives have used field deployments of peace operations as platforms for engagement and have proven popular for their targeted and flexible nature. There is a clear point of convergence between these efforts and the actions of development partners focusing on local peacebuilding and reconciliation as well as broader community- or area-based economic recovery and social protection programming. However, questions remain as to their accountability and sustainability. Similar to other types of decentralized efforts to strengthen security at the local level, community violence reduction, in particular, has been criticized for inadvertently empowering gangs, stigmatizing certain communities, and lacking adequate oversight (Muggah 2017).

**Security and Justice Reform**

Another area of convergence between different operations has been in the area of security and justice reform as part of efforts to improve effectiveness, civilian oversight, and accountability of the state (UN Secretary-General 2013). While historically mandated in the context of peace operations, reform of security and justice institutions has increasingly been supported through development assistance. In policing, for instance, collaborative operations between peacekeeping and development actors have provided direct operational support to enhance national capacity to restore and maintain law and order, providing training and technical assistance for legal reform and institutional strengthening (UN Secretary-General 2016b). With respect to justice and corrections, technical advisory support from a wide range of sources has been deployed to support legal and institutional reforms and to boost professionalism and capacity through direct technical support and advice (DPKO 2016). This support changes significantly in contexts marked by the absence of a clear political settlement or
peace agreement, as in Mali and South Sudan. In these cases, support for security and justice sector reform can be provided during peace negotiations or national dialogue processes through upstream provision of technical advice.

**Building National Capacity for Mediation**

The shift in mediation practice from a “state-centric” model toward inclusive processes involving governmental and nongovernmental actors has been complemented with stronger support for national and local mediation capacities. Provision of capacity development assistance—through training, development of guidance, and institutional strengthening—has been supported by civil society, development, and multilateral organizations alike, often forming part of governance or peacebuilding programming. Since 2012, for instance, the United Nations has partnered with the EU to support “national and local mediation” capacities in 14 countries with a focus on dialogue and negotiation (box 7.16). Together, the United Nations and the EU have supported national platforms for mediation and dialogue in Bolivia and Ghana; youth and women organizations in Chad, the Maldives, and Togo; and national dialogue processes in Guyana, Mauritania, Nepal, and the Republic of Yemen. Best-practice guidelines have been summarized in a joint publication by the United Nations and EU, joining similar guidelines for mediating conflicts over natural resources and guidance on gender and inclusive mediation strategies (UN Secretary-General 2012).

**BOX 7.16 Strengthening National Capacities for Conflict Prevention**

Within the United Nations, the Program on Building National Capacities for Conflict Prevention is an example of conflict prevention programming that brings together political and developmental comparative advantage, capitalizing on the diversity within the United Nations system (UNDP and Department of Political Affairs 2016). Drawing on a cadre of peace and development advisers (PDAs), the joint program helps in-country UN personnel to strengthen national capacities and infrastructures for peace. Growing exponentially, 42 PDAs were deployed globally in 2016.

The role of PDAs is to adapt and respond to complex political situations and to develop and implement strategic prevention initiatives and programs. Broadly speaking, they engage in four core areas: (a) providing strategic advice and conflict analysis support to UN personnel in their relations with host government officials; (b) identifying areas of programmatic engagement with national stakeholders related to social cohesion, dialogue, conflict prevention, peacebuilding, or other relevant fields; (c) establishing strategic partnerships with key national stakeholders, regional and international actors, and development partners; and (d) strengthening the capacity of UNDP and the UN country team to undertake conflict analysis and mainstream conflict sensitivity in regular programming.

In 2016, for example, the joint program engagements ranged from strengthening dialogue, mediation, and national peace architectures in Kenya, Niger, the Philippines, and Ukraine to enabling strategic responses of the United Nations system through conflict analysis in Burundi and Tunisia and from conducting recovery and peacebuilding assessments with the World Bank and the EU in Cameroon and Nigeria to supporting the design of conflict prevention programs in Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Tajikistan.

*Sources: Batmanglich 2017; UNDP and Department of Political Affairs 2016.*
Development Support for Negotiations

Development assistance can be a useful resource for mediators seeking to facilitate comprehensive agreements on the social, economic, and governance provisions of a peace settlement or successor agreement. This support is particularly important, where multilayer agreements are under negotiation (that is, where they focus not just on high-level political issues but also on broader social, economic, and institutional issues). Development institutions such as the World Bank have provided technical advice and guidance on the development of economic provisions of political settlements. In complex multilevel mediation efforts that span various stages of political negotiation toward a comprehensive settlement, development actors help to identify and frame technical issues, assess the developmental and fiscal impacts of negotiated settlements, and provide advisory assistance on options.

In the context of the 2011 Gulf Cooperation Council peace agreement in the Republic of Yemen, for instance, which included the organization of a national dialogue to achieve consensus on key national priorities, development partners actively supported the UN special envoy in identifying, framing, and organizing negotiations around key social and economic issues. Development assistance can also support the translation of political “blueprints” for governance arrangements into reality through investments in institutional development. Technical support and development of capacity of the parties in peace negotiations between the government of the Philippines and Mindanao Islamic Liberation Front was provided by the UN and the World Bank through the Facility for Advisory Support for Transition Capacities, or FASTRAC. In Burkina Faso, for example, the International Follow-up and Support Group for the Transition in Burkina Faso, established in December 2014, aimed to implement the transition roadmap and provided diplomatic, technical, and financial support to the transitional government in restoring peace and preparing for the 2015 presidential and legislative elections. This group was composed of the African Union, ECOWAS, and the United Nations, international and regional actors, and development partners, including the World Bank (Fong 2017).

Conclusion

Since the end of the Cold War, the multilateral architecture for conflict prevention and postconflict peacebuilding has struggled to adapt to a fast-changing situation in the field and globally. Despite many challenges, there have been some clear achievements. At a systemic level, comprehensive international normative and legal frameworks are in place to regulate the tools and conduct of war; protect human rights; address global threats including climate change, terrorism, and transnational criminal networks; and promote inclusive approaches to development (the SDGs). Several of these aspects are reflected in the 2030 Agenda.

Operationally, the United Nations and regional organizations such as the African Union and the EU have provided global and regional forums to coordinate international responses to threats to peace and stability. The results have been important tools stretching across the conflict cycle—including preventive diplomacy, protection of civilians, and peace operations—which have proven instrumental in preventing conflicts, mediating cease-fires and peace agreements, and supporting postconflict recovery and transition processes.

Growing collaboration between efforts to prevent violent conflict and development actors has been a key part of these developments. As conflicts have increasingly originated from and disrupted the core institutions of states, international and regional initiatives have accompanied these changes with greater coordination and resource pooling between development, diplomatic, and security efforts. In preventive diplomacy, this coordination has been demonstrated by the involvement of diverse stakeholders, the codification of mediation, and its broadening both thematically and in terms of its application at all levels and phases of conflict. Peacekeeping has evolved...
from a narrow focus on monitoring cease-fires and peace agreements to complex multidimensional missions with mandates to consolidate peace, stabilize the country, and support the restoration of state authority. Development assistance is shifting toward earlier engagement, more attention to socioeconomic and institutional drivers of fragility and conflict, and improved alignment with diplomatic, peace, and security efforts.

While this evolution is welcome, with conflicts becoming more fragmented, more complex, and more transnational, these tools are profoundly challenged—entry points for diplomatic engagement are harder to find (Gowan and Stedman 2018; Walter 2017), and peace operations are increasingly deployed to insecure environments. Meanwhile, multilateral engagement, per se, is tested by the emergence of nonstate actors uninterested in state-based power, ideologies at odds with international humanitarian law, and the increased sponsorship of proxy warfare by global and regional powers, as discussed in chapter 1. Each of these elements decreases the incentives of violent actors to accept mediation and increases the resistance of the international community to accept the terms of negotiated settlements.

These conclusions increase the need to focus on country pathways—the endogenous risk factors that engender violence and support for countries to address their own crises. Despite notable successes, current tools for international support are challenged with engaging effectively before the risks of violence become manifest. To some degree, this challenge reflects the difficulty of gaining accurate information, as even the most sophisticated EWSs offer only short time frames for averting crisis. However, in larger part, the lack of incentives of actors to identify and address broader risks presents the wider challenge.

At its core, preventive action now is instigated in large part by actions to mitigate violence and its impact on individual rights and by the international and regional system, rather than by countries’ own development progress. When dealing with a new generation of conflicts, governance of multilateral tools and the mandate to instruct engagements on developmental, peace, and security dimensions of conflict are often fragmented between institutions and actors.

Bringing the full power of international tools to bear on today’s risks requires a much greater level of coordination and convergence than has been present historically. Achieving this demands a realignment of incentives to encourage greater collaboration among states and within the multilateral system. Chapter 8 turns to this challenge.

Notes
2. See UN General Assembly (2016a) and Articles 2 and 3 of the UN Charter. The sustaining peace resolutions reaffirmed this principle, recognizing “the primary responsibility of national Governments and authorities in identifying, driving, and directing priorities, strategies, and activities for sustaining peace … emphasizing that sustaining peace is a shared task and responsibility that needs to be fulfilled by the Government and all other national stakeholders” (UN General Assembly 2016a; UN Security Council 2016).
3. Of the 63 resolutions adopted by the Security Council in 2014, 32 were adopted “acting under Chapter VII of the Charter” (approximately 51 percent), while in 2015, 35 of the 64 resolutions were adopted “acting under Chapter VII of the Charter” (approximately 55 percent). As in previous periods, most of those resolutions concerned the mandates of UN and regional peacekeeping missions or multinational forces and the imposition, extension, modification, or termination of sanctions measures (see, for example, UN Department of Political Affairs 2015b, 4).
4. The topics covered under these thematic debates is an arena of evolving multilateral agreement. During 2014 and 2015, for example, under the broad category of maintenance of international peace and security, the Security Council held 17 meetings, more than a fivefold increase with respect to the previous two years. Subagenda items
discussed in this period also multiplied and included the following: (a) war, its lessons, and the search for a permanent peace; (b) security sector reform; (c) conflict prevention; (d) inclusive development for the maintenance of international peace and security; (e) the role of youth in countering violent extremism; (f) peace and security challenges facing small islands developing states; (g) regional organizations and contemporary challenges of global security; and (h) trafficking of persons in situations of conflict (see, for example, UN Department of Political Affairs 2015b, 2).

5. According to the Union of International Associations, intergovernmental organizations are defined as bodies that are based on a formal instrument of agreement between national governments, include at least three nation states, and possess a permanent secretariat performing ongoing tasks. See http://www.uia.org/archive/types-organization/cc.

6. Chapter VIII of the UN Charter recognizes the importance of regional arrangements in support of the maintenance of international peace and security and stresses that “no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council” (UN Charter, Ch. VIII, Art. 53).


8. “The right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity” (African Union 2000).

9. “We pledge not to bequeath the burden of conflicts to the next generation of Africans and undertake to end all wars in Africa by 2020” (African Union 2013, art. E).

10. For example, official development assistance to countries with high risk of conflict averages US$250 million per year, only slightly higher than that to countries at peace, but increases to US$700 million during open conflict and US$400 million during recovery years. Similarly, peacekeeping support averages US$30 million a year for countries at high risk, compared with US$100 million for countries in open conflict and US$300 during recovery (Mueller 2017).

11. Many government-owned or government-sponsored conflict prediction systems are classified. Since the early 2000s, the United Nations has undertaken significant steps to anticipate and prevent violent conflict, and the World Bank is currently developing the Global Risk Scan, a tool designed to identify multifaceted fragility, conflict, and violence risks in countries across the globe.

12. Some governmental and intergovernmental early warning systems have civil society reporting components, for example, the African Union, CEWARN, and ECOWARN all have links to civil society networks, while early warning systems in the Southern African Development Community and the International Conference of the Great Lakes Region rely on state intelligence (ATF 2016).

13. Third-generation EWSs are located in conflict areas with strong local networks. The objective is to detect conflict and link EWS to response mechanisms, where monitors act as “first responders.”

14. Article 55 of the UN Charter states that to support the “creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, the United Nations shall promote … universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion” (UN Charter, Preamble). See UN General Assembly (2003), also the “Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action” (World Conference on Human Rights 1993): “The efforts of the United Nations system towards the universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all, contribute to the stability and well-being necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations, and to improved conditions for peace and security as well as social and economic development,
in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations.”

15. The potential of the Universal Peer Review to contribute to conflict prevention and peacebuilding efforts was acknowledged in the sustaining peace resolutions (UN General Assembly 2016b, para. 11; UN Security Council 2016).

16. This has occurred gradually, with member states having ratified universal human rights instruments adopted under the aegis of the United Nations, and organizations like the African Union, the Council of Europe, and the Organization of American States having adopted regional instruments, the implementation of which is supported by civil society organizations and national human rights institutions.

17. Growing confidence in mediation has resulted in expanded capabilities to support such processes. Despite data gaps, there has been a significant increase in the number of deployed envoys, special advisers, and political missions over the past 10–15 years. These entities have taken up an increasingly broad range of functions, including early warning and analysis, coordination of regional mediation initiatives, and direct support for mediation before, during, and after crises and conflicts. Special political missions alone have increased in number by 70 percent, and spending has increased by a factor of 13, since 2000 (UN Secretary-General 2017a).

18. In 2016, the Security Council requested the United Nations Office for West Africa (UNOWA) and the Office of the Special Envoy for the Sahel to merge into a single entity, the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS).

19. Since 2008 the UN’s Mediation Support Unit, with a standby team of senior mediation experts has provided tailored advice to national negotiators and international mediators (see www.peacemaker.un.org).

20. While qualitative cases indicate the potential importance of diplomatic engagement in both coordinating international and regional action and bridging conflict parties, few studies have assessed these cases against data. Regan (2010, 2012), building on Goldstone et al. (2010), assesses the success of interventions in countries and periods with a high risk of civil war. Regan (2012) concludes that military interventions increase the likelihood of civil war, economic interventions have no effect on the likelihood of war, and diplomatic interventions decrease the likelihood of war (for example, Hoeffler 2013).

21. The meaning of success is much disputed among scholars of international mediation, and indicators vary substantially. Success rates of mediation have been measured on the basis of whether mediation has been accepted, whether violence has ended, whether conflicting parties have reached a formal agreement, and how long it holds. When measuring success against whether the parties reach any type of agreement (from cease-fire to comprehensive settlement), Wallensteen and Svensson (2014) conclude that 55 percent of mediated processes fail, in part, because they often do not result in such formalized outcomes. There are also signs that mediation successes are evolving. Building on the UCDP conflict termination data, Kreutz (2010) has calculated that, in the 1990s, 46.1 percent of conflicts that ended by negotiated settlement restarted, but the number of conflicts returning to violence decreased to 21.0 percent in the 2000s, suggesting that learning led to more lasting successes later.

22. Bercovitch and Wells (1993) find that in interstate conflicts, 29 percent of mediation attempts resulted in a cease-fire or more enduring peace. However, Svensson and Lundgren (2015) show that more than 60 percent of cases of mediation led to an abatement of crisis between 1945 and 2005. For other studies on the effectiveness of mediation, see, for example, Beardsley et al. 2006; Bercovitch and Wells 1993; Eisenkopf and Bachtiger 2013; Shrodt and Gerner 2004; Wilkenfeld et al. 2003).

23. Data confirm that multifaceted approaches used in tandem with other tools render mediation more effective. For instance, there is “strong empirical evidence” that mediation in combination with a peacekeeping operation highly correlates with nonrecurrence (DeRouen and Chowdhury 2016). Mediated agreements that encompass political, military, territorial, and justice provisions also decrease the risk of recurrence, although the likelihood of recurrence
rises over time in mediated cases (Beardsley 2011; DeRouen and Chowdhury 2016; Fortna 2003; Joshi and Quinn 2016a, 2016b).


25. Beardsley and Gleditsch (2015) explore whether the deployment of external peacekeepers can prevent violent conflict from spreading within a country once a civil war has broken out. Using geo-referenced conflict polygons between 1990 and 2010, the authors find that peacekeeping missions that are large, especially when there are many troops, have a strong containment effect.

26. All references to Kosovo should be understood in the context of UN Security Council Resolution 1244 (UN Security Council 1999).

27. The practice of peace operations in these areas has been codified in various policy and guidance documents, with support and resources provided through the Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions at headquarters level (which also supports special political missions led by the Department of Political Affairs).

28. According to the UN Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines (Capstone Doctrine; UN 2008), the role of multidimensional peacekeeping operations is to “create a secure and stable environment while strengthening the State’s ability to provide security, with full respect for the rule of law and human rights; facilitate the political process by promoting dialogue and reconciliation and supporting the establishment of legitimate and effective institutions of governance; and provide a framework for ensuring that all United Nations and other international actors pursue their activities at the country-level in a coherent and coordinated manner” (POTI 2010).

29. More recent studies dispute this link, citing methodological questions (Christian and Barrett 2017) and arguing that the macro-level analysis hides important spatial distribution effects (Gehring, Kaplan, and Wong 2017).

30. In order to enable countries to access financing at early sign of risks of violent conflict, the World Bank has created a risk mitigation facility under IDA 18 to support countries in their prevention efforts. See http://ida.worldbank.org/financing/ida-special-allocation-index-isi-0.

31. ODA is composed of many elements including, for example, humanitarian aid, debt relief, and country programmable aid. When removing special-purpose flows such as humanitarian aid and debt relief, country programmable aid can provide a good estimate of funding used for development programming in recipient countries and thus is often used as a proxy for development aid at the country level.

32. While ODA flows fell in the mid-1990s because of fiscal consolidations in donor countries, overall flows rose again after 1998.

33. According to official data collected by the OECD Development Assistance Committee. Total ODA flows corresponded to 0.32 percent of GNI of member countries in 2016. Despite the sizable increases, this still falls short of the long-standing 0.7 percent of GNI commitment.

34. A 1988 rule allows donor countries to include the costs of hosting refugees in ODA for the first year after arrival. Development Assistance Committee (2017) notes that efforts are ongoing to revise ODA reporting rules to minimize the risk that spending on refugees diverts from spending on development.

35. The group of 56 fragile contexts defined by the OECD hosts approximately 22 percent of the world’s population, but only attracts 5 percent of the global total of foreign direct investment (OECD 2016).

36. Relevant missions include MONUSCO in the Democratic Republic of Congo, MINUSMA in Mali, MINUSTAH in Haiti, UNMISS in South Sudan, and MINUSCA in the Central African Republic (Gorur 2016).

37. The shift to “bottom-up” approaches is a reaction to important failures of more state-centric approaches to stabilization that were tried in the Democratic Republic of Congo between 2008 and 2011, in which “top-down” approaches to state authority had the result of extending institutions that were perceived as illegitimate, reproduced certain “predatory” characteristics, and failed to provide frameworks for adequate governance of complex local conflict, social, and other dynamics (De Vries 2016).
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Additional Reading


