



CHAPTER 6

Country Approaches to Preventing Violent Conflict

The pathway to peace or conflict for each society is unique. The previous chapters introduce a framework explaining how societies create and maintain pathways via the unique interplay of structural factors, institutions, and actors. This chapter reviews the experience of countries that have avoided violent conflict, prevented its escalation, or rebuilt peace afterward.

Drawing on the 19 country case studies prepared for this study, this chapter draws out several commonalities from the experiences of countries that have successfully prevented violence, interrupted its escalation, or avoided its recurrence.¹ This chapter draws on country examples in several ways: through a fine slicing of the country cases to apply to a particular aspect of prevention and illustrate a specific point and through a more integrated examination of selected cases—presented in text boxes—that bring together the multiple factors that have coalesced in order to steer a country's pathway to peace.

The discussion is not comprehensive and is not intended as an exhaustive examination of all possible actions that were taken to prevent conflict. This chapter highlights the experiences of countries in addressing the risks of exclusion and mobilization of grievances, especially within the arenas of contestation, as discussed in chapters 4 and 5. While the discussion highlights policy choices or transition moments in country pathways, it is understood that these were all

part of longer trajectories. The chapter focuses on domestic actors, including the state, the private sector, and civil society, and it emphasizes the comparative advantages of these different actors. Chapter 7 focuses on the role and contribution of the international community.

As part of efforts to sustain peace, prevention requires three areas of action: (1) influencing actors' incentives in favor of prevention, (2) reforming institutions, and (3) investing to address structural challenges. These areas must be addressed simultaneously, rather than sequentially. In most cases, this has involved constantly monitoring and mitigating short-term risks in order to anticipate shocks and prevent them from triggering violence and taking advantage of transition moments while also addressing structural risks.

This chapter describes country experiences in building on transition moments and engaging across the three areas of action: influencing incentives, transforming institutions, and targeting structural factors. This does not imply that all actions fall neatly or exclusively into these categories. In reality, many actions have multiple effects. For example, efforts to promote inclusion in the security forces address both an institutional factor (reform of the security sector) as well as a structural one (historical exclusion that underlies disproportionate access to security), while also shifting incentives (creating stronger

sanctions against violence). This study does not assume that all actions referred to were undertaken for the sole purpose of preventing violent conflict, as many were guided by other objectives. However, all have demonstrated transformational² potential to curve a society's pathway toward sustainable peace.

Navigating Transition Moments

Transition moments enable new efforts to prevent or recover from violence (World Bank 2011, xvii). They may occur at any point along a country's trajectory and provide a window of opportunity whereby actors can change the direction of a pathway. As discussed in chapter 3, a peaceful pathway often results from actions taken during multiple transition moments rather than a single event. These moments open or facilitate opportunities for actors to address underlying grievances through institutional reform or investments, develop a national implementation plan, rally support for the plan among all segments of the population, and signal the importance of equitable and inclusive development. By their very nature, transition moments are difficult to predict and anticipate and, indeed, may present themselves when actors least expect them and are often ill-prepared to act on them.

Transition moments come in many forms and can be triggered by a confluence of internal or external factors. In some cases, they occur suddenly: natural disasters or economic shocks, political changes such as elections or new constitutions, or actor-related changes such as the death of a leader can shift incentives quickly. Other transition moments emerge more gradually. While the Revolution of 2011 in Tunisia, for example, represented a turning point for the country, it resulted from a buildup of grievances related to unmet expectations. This transition moment led to civil protests, which paved the way for a transition from authoritarianism toward a more open and inclusive political system (Toska 2017). A second transition moment occurred with the shared realization that political

deadlock put economic stability and political progress at risk, and a power-sharing agreement then opened a path to further reform.

Managing Outbreaks of Violence

In many cases examined for this study, the way in which national actors managed outbreaks of violence became a transition moment. Violence can bring society to a crossroads, with a choice between continuing to escalate the violence or interrupting the violence to create an opening for a shift in direction. The introduction of a peacekeeping mission or a cease-fire, as happened in Liberia and Timor-Leste in 2006, can alter the incentives toward negotiations. Mediation and diplomacy can also reroute an incendiary situation. For example, in Kenya, in 2008, the intervention of a coalition led by Kofi Annan interrupted tit-for-tat violence that was escalating and gaining momentum. It opened a window of opportunity for resolution via dialogue (Lindenmayer and Kaye 2009).

The ability to recognize a transition moment and act in a swift, decisive manner is key. The 2012 oil shutdown in South Sudan and border war with Sudan demonstrated the rapidity with which the situation could deteriorate in the nascent country (Verjee 2017). It also presented an opportunity for the international community, led by the African Union and widely supported by key donors and allies, to seal the September 2012 Cooperation Agreement between Sudan and South Sudan. While this was a crucial step forward, the agreement itself did not account for structural weakness and ongoing violence within South Sudan, and few of the commitments to the agreement have since been met (Verjee 2017).

Maintaining Macroeconomic Stability

The lead-up to violent conflict often puts tremendous pressure on macroeconomic equilibrium, particularly with respect to inflation and state budgets (Carey and

Harake 2017). A fiscal shock in these environments—for example, linked to a terms of trade adjustment, a collapse in commodity prices, or a fall in tax revenues—can force the government to make unexpected fiscal adjustments, cut consumption subsidies, or reduce the civil service wage bill.

In many of the country cases examined for this study, maintaining macrofiscal stability has created a hard imperative for transition in critical areas, for example, reform of subsidies. Such reforms offer a distinct development opportunity in that they free up public resources and allow countries to reap sizable benefits in terms of overall social welfare, economic efficiency, and fiscal stability.³ However, subsidy reform is complex in itself (Carey and Harake 2017; Vagliasindi 2012) and can act as a trigger of violence (Clements et al. 2013; OECD 2011, 2012).⁴ Cases of reform reversal in Jordan (2011), Indonesia (2012), and Thailand (2013) all point to the political difficulties of staying the course. Moreover, they underscore the fiscal risks associated with reversals in the reform process (Inchauste and Victor 2017).⁵ The timing of cuts also needs to be chosen carefully—for example, when prices are already low—and the country should receive adequate support from the international community and multilateral institutions to be able to make these adjustments with sufficient flexibility.

In socially and politically polarized contexts, taking advantage of macroeconomic transitions requires careful management to avoid the perception that some groups may benefit disproportionately or be harmed. Combining subsidy reform with robust safety nets helps to mitigate the risk of destabilization. An effective communications strategy can help to secure buy-in from a broad set of domestic and international stakeholders.⁶ Yet, social safety nets and direct compensation programs are rarely effective in identifying and properly targeting those who lose out from subsidy cuts.⁷ This ineffectiveness can fuel grievances and fray the social contract that helps to maintain a measure of stability in many low- and middle-income countries, on the assumption that the public tolerates

less-than-perfect governance because essential goods are subsidized. The mismatch can also cause a backlash against subsidy reform, which can undermine social cohesion and escalate conflict. For these reasons, leaders have a strong incentive and imperative to maintain macroeconomic stability as a part of prevention, especially in situations at risk of violent conflict.

Capitalizing on External Shocks

Exogenous shocks such as natural disasters or major shifts in the global economy can paradoxically reset dynamics for prevention by altering incentives and shaking up entrenched positions. The Boxing Day tsunami in 2004 is often noted as having helped to push through agreement in Aceh, Indonesia. The tsunami damaged many existing institutions, including much of the military's control infrastructure, and precipitated a humanitarian crisis that incentivized the rebels to come to the negotiating table. The influx of some US\$7 billion in aid resources for rebuilding, combined with a collective focus on common goals of recovery and reconstruction, provided a platform from which the community could renegotiate norms and expectations. It compelled the government and rebels to demonstrate willingness to make progress toward peace, especially given the scrutiny and support of international actors (Renner and Chafe 2006).

The earthquake that hit Nepal in April 2015, killing more than 8,000 people and leaving much of the center of the country in ruins, is another example of how a natural disaster can open a window of opportunity for prevention (von Einsiedel and Salih 2017). The Constituent Assembly had spent several years debating a new constitution, unable to agree on the federalist restructuring of the state. The inadequate response to the earthquake and the ensuing humanitarian disaster contributed to a hasty deal on a new constitution, which was eventually adopted in September 2015 (von Einsiedel and Salih 2017). As in South Sudan, however, the acute need translated into limited consultation and insufficient consideration

of structures and institutional realities and thus undermined the ability to target underlying risks (Verjee 2017; von Einsiedel and Salih 2017).

Global shocks, even when not proximate to violent conflict, can also create transition moments for action. Northern Ireland's peace process was advanced by the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States, which delegitimized the use of terror tactics (Walsh 2017; box 6.1) and increased pressure on all sides to seek solutions through peace talks. With time, a full-scale return to violence became unthinkable, as the benefits of institutional change and

increased participation became more visible (Walsh 2017). Similarly, in both Indonesia and the Kyrgyz Republic, economic crises helped to tighten purse strings, hasten the process of bringing warring parties in alignment on a peace deal (Timor-Leste in Indonesia), and resolve an ongoing standoff (the Kyrgyz Republic) (Jaffrey 2017; Logvinenko 2017).

Exploiting Hurting Stalemates

When parties recognize that they cannot be victorious over one another, either militarily (when the losses from fighting outweigh

BOX 6.1 Political Inclusion in Northern Ireland

Improving political inclusion. Northern Ireland's path away from decades of conflict and armed violence was made possible by gradual political inclusion. The Anglo-Irish Agreement was struck in 1985, giving Ireland input into the administration of Northern Ireland, pending the development of devolved institutions accepted by both communities. In the Good Friday Agreement of 1998, Ireland deleted its territorial claim to Northern Ireland from its constitution, and the British government acknowledged that it would "stay out of the way" if both parties were for Irish unity. An elected assembly was established in Northern Ireland with a power-sharing executive chosen based on the proportional allocation of seats. In addition, a north-south ministerial council was established to promote cross-border cooperation.

Incentives for more inclusive politics. Arriving at an eventual power-sharing arrangement was motivated largely by mutual experience of trying other avenues for influence and control, for example, using ongoing violent tactics and internationalizing the struggle. Over time, resources on both sides were drained, the military conflict had reached a deadlock, and the

international community was not going to take sides to resolve it. Inclusion in realistic settlement talks was a powerful incentive to consider ceasing violence, since exclusion from power or self-determination was a cause of conflict. Once the need for alternative approaches was recognized at government and nongovernment levels, enough momentum for change was created to consider compromise.

Important opportunities for changing the dynamics were created when the United Kingdom and Ireland joined the European Economic Community in 1973. Membership gradually strengthened Ireland's own sense of legitimacy and sovereignty, through interaction with and recognition of an important international institution on its own terms. This critical third-party relationship opened opportunities for informal discussions on social and economic changes. It helped to strengthen avenues for influence other than violence and to change the perception of violence as a worthwhile option. The fruit of this relationship was the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985. This 20-year relationship laid the groundwork for the approval of substantial resources from the European Union (EU), which were essential to putting the peace process into action.

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BOX 6.1 Political Inclusion in Northern Ireland (continued)

At the community level, one critical example of important trust-building opportunities came through the newly formed police service of Northern Ireland. A policy of equal recruitment and a completely new identity, including name and uniforms, helped to balance power institutionally and symbolically and to open doors for overcoming divisions.

Means for prevention were strengthened substantially by international resources. The EU's commitment over recent decades of some €2 billion provided a common concern for both sides. Through the relationship came an investment of both money and time. The first EU program, PEACE I, was an investment over 5 years (1994–99). PEACE II was for 7 years (2000–07), and PEACE III was for 13 years (2007–20), reflecting the gradual strengthening over two and half decades—the minimum timeframe in which transition toward sustainable peace can be expected. At the same time, the United States worked to reduce the means for violence by advocating that Irish Americans support the deal rather than provide tacit or financial support for a cause using violent tactics.

Short-term change with long-term vision. Both the Anglo-Irish Agreement and the EU support combined near-term changes with a vision for longer-term change, leading from greater political and social inclusion toward devolving power and resources. Education and community development projects created visible, relevant, and tangible changes that strengthened incentives to support cease-fires. Interim bodies were established to manage certain governance functions and enable the transfer of responsibilities over time. Transitioning away from EU funding will still present challenges in the future. Dependency on aid funds instead of the government for certain areas of social spending is heavy. Deep divisions also remain, especially with regard to housing and education. The U.K. vote in June 2016 to leave the EU is a

further test of the political and economic dynamics. On the one hand, the decision could support the unionist cause.

Reestablishing a hard border between Ireland and Northern Ireland could undermine a key pillar of the Good Friday Agreement and bring into question the funding that Northern Ireland receives from the U.K. government.

Trade-offs. Improving political inclusion necessitated trade-offs for both sides. Once incentives were strong enough, a key compromise was the British agreeing, in principle, to include “terrorists” in negotiations. The Irish Republican Army (IRA) had to relinquish the use of violence and, therefore, their main source of power. Early demands for decommissioning weapons, however, proved a step too far, resulting in a brief resurgence of IRA violence. Progress became possible again once decommissioning was renegotiated as a gradual process, rather than as a prerequisite to talks. This agreement aligned better with the time necessary to build trust and establish alternative institutions for conflict resolution.

Global events were powerful in both propelling the conflict early on and helping to improve political inclusion to prevent further violence later. The original protests against unionist rule drew inspiration from the U.S. civil rights movement. Global events such as the political and social changes that followed the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 caused a rethinking of dogmatism. Peace negotiations in other major conflicts such as the Middle East and South Africa in the 1990s and the terrorist attacks in the United States in 2001 also delegitimized revolutionary violence. This, in turn, lent legitimacy to nationalists moving away from violence and toward peace talks, but retaining the support of their base for the cause and avoiding major splits in the movement. The Good Friday Agreement called on democracy to decide Irish unity, requiring only a vote by the majority to change the situation.

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BOX 6.1 Political Inclusion in Northern Ireland *(continued)*

Improving political inclusion in Northern Ireland clearly shows the intersection of domestic with regional and international actors, institutions, and structural factors. Incentives and means for resolution and prevention efforts, while ultimately locally dependent, drew heavily on regional and international relationships and institutions. Resources

Sources: Walsh 2017; World Bank 2011.

and relationships from the EU and various U.S. administrations were critical in changing political calculations to prioritize prevention. Ongoing prevention continues to rely on exercising political inclusion, now institutionalized, to navigate difficult actor-related, institutional, and structural factors, such as the effects of separation from the EU.

the sense of gains or when combatants, seeing the mounting costs of war, lose the desire to fight) or politically (when the risks of further conflict outweigh the potential gains of a peaceful settlement), space is created for a transition from violence to peaceful resolution of conflict. Those attuned to this dynamic can recognize and capitalize on such moments.

Hurting stalemates—situations where neither side can win, but neither wants to retreat—can play a decisive role in the decision to lay down arms (Brahm 2003; Fong and Day 2017; Zartman 2001). This was seen in the decision by combatants in Sierra Leone to end the conflict and sue for peace. In Liberia, too, growing fatigue among combatants and the public at-large contributed to termination of the civil war (Marc, Verjee, and Mogaka 2015). It galvanized civil society and women's groups to lend their influence and weight to a peace agreement. In Nepal, after almost a decade of civil war, a mutually hurting stalemate brought about a realization by both sides that violence was no longer a tenable path to power (von Einsiedel and Salih 2017). The warring parties finally entered serious peace negotiations, which paved the way for restructuring the centralized, unitary state toward inclusive, progressive democracy and full political participation of the Maoists (von Einsiedel and Salih 2017). In Indonesia, too, a sense of fatigue contributed to the Malino II Accord that halted hostilities between Christian and Muslim militias in Maluku and Sulawesi

after the parties had mutually exhausted one another's organizational capacity for violence (Jaffrey 2017). In the Central African Republic, the widespread desire among much of the population to see the back of violence has been cited as one of the glimmers of possibility for resolution in the war-torn country; there is hope in the mere existence of a strong desire among Central Africans to find a way out of vicious cycles of conflict (Lombard 2017).

Changing Actors' Incentives

The incentives and interests of actors go to the heart of whether prevention efforts are successful. Particularly when the threat of violence is imminent, incentives are often stacked against prioritizing prevention. Actions in favor of crisis prevention or mitigation are often heavy with risk, not least physical, and may have uncertain outcomes for the actors who control the means of violence. Decisions in favor of violence, in contrast, often have specific and tangible results. As such, mobilizing actors' incentives in favor of peaceful action involves managing difficult choices and trade-offs.

Strengthening Leadership

From Burkina Faso and Tunisia to Indonesia and Niger, the leadership of key actors has played an outside role in preventive action. Leadership is more than occupying a position of institutional power. It includes the ability to mobilize others and to guide

a process of political and social change. Clear, decisive leadership exerts a powerful influence on the calculus of other actors. For example, Mahatma Gandhi in India and Nelson Mandela in South Africa built and guided broad coalitions with a vision for social and political change.

Leaders can promote institutional change and build or activate coalitions that rally support, spread risk, and create opportunities. Leaders are often in a unique position to identify and act on transition moments or opportunities for prevention; through the careful use of narrative, they can invoke or shape norms and values that can underwrite prevention—both in moments of crisis and over time.

In many of the case studies examined for this chapter, decisive leadership has provided the incentives for peaceful contestation of power. For example, in Burundi, President Pierre Buyoya demonstrated political willingness to build an inclusive government that helped to bring about the Arusha Accords in 2000 (Nygard et al. 2017). His efforts succeeded where previous attempts at power sharing had failed and ushered in a transitional government that handed power to a democratically elected government in 2005. It was backed by a framework that addressed fundamental ethnic inequalities in politics, brought warring parties to the table, and strengthened the representative nature and oversight capacities of Parliament (Nygard et al. 2017).

Strong and visionary leadership following the flush of a peace agreement and cessation of hostilities remains a critical element in sustaining a country along a peaceful pathway and in building on early gains. The role of leadership was central to ensuring the continuation of peace in Liberia and Sierra Leone following the end of the bloody conflicts in the Mano River basin. In the wake of peace agreements in Liberia and Sierra Leone and the resolution of postelection tensions in Côte d'Ivoire, each country's president was credited with steering a pathway toward improved relations with donors, improved economic governance, and a more open and inclusive democratic environment (Marc, Verjee, and Mogaka 2015).

Decisive leadership also involves gambles that can sometimes come at steep personal cost. In Indonesia, President Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie's surprise decision to hold the 1999 referendum on Timor-Leste, which had been forcefully annexed in 1975 with the death of almost 19,000 people, offered a solution to the long-held resentment on the part of the Timorese people. The move found favor with various elements in government, including the military leadership. However, the eventual secession was unpopular among some Indonesians and may have cost President Habibie, who had previously indicated that he was not in favor of full secession, his position two months later (Jaffrey 2017).

Changes in leadership can pave the way to an alternate course of action and enable a deescalation of tensions. The departure of leaders who have contributed to the escalation of violence and conflict through intransigence and self-interested behavior has created opportunities for transition toward prevention and peace. In Malawi, the death of President Bingu wa Mutharika in 2012 opened the door for new leadership in the form of his Vice President Joyce Banda. Her appointment—and strong connection to civil society—helped to defuse tensions and move the country away from the confrontation and violence that had been stoked by a combination of a crack-down on civil liberties, economic mismanagement, and efforts to centralize executive power (Stackpool-Moore and Bacalja Perianes 2017).

Critical moments that helped to open a path for more peaceful resolution of conflicts in The Gambia also hinged on the eventual decision of the president of the country to step down from office. In The Gambia, popular opposition backed by efforts of regional leaders and the United Nations (UN) special representative for West Africa and the Sahel, coupled with the imminent threat of military intervention by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), was sufficient to persuade President Yahya Jammeh to negotiate his departure from office after losing the election (Steven and Gerlach 2017).

His decision to stand down led to a peaceful transition of power to the legitimate president, Adama Barrow. Therefore, just as Jammeh's decision to dig in precipitated a crisis, his decision to leave office—accompanied by suitable inducements—enabled its deescalation (Steven and Gerlach 2017).

Diplomacy and mediation have at times succeeded in shifting the incentives of leaders, especially during a crisis and in concert with pressure exerted by local and national actors:

- The mediation that followed Kenya's 2007–08 election violence is one example of this (Lindenmayer and Kaye 2009). When talks stalled, the lead mediator, Kofi Annan, made a public statement, emphasizing the agency and responsibility held by President Mwai Kibaki and the leader of the opposition, Raila Odinga. By underscoring that “peace lay on the shoulders of the two more powerful leaders in the country,” he placed the onus on them to act in the best interests of the country and its people in the medium term (Lindenmayer and Kaye 2009).
- In Burkina Faso, the international community, regional partners, and domestic actors all worked via diplomatic means to influence the calculus of President Blaise Compaore, who had escalated tensions by pursuing efforts for constitutional change. His sudden decision to resign took the country by surprise and left the military to fill the void. International partners and local actors then successfully prevailed on the military, including through the threat of sanctions, to permit a civilian-led transition (Fong 2017).
- In the Republic of Yemen, in 2011, President Ali Abdullah Saleh was encouraged to step down from his post by the Gulf Cooperation Council in return for immunity from prosecution after multiple previous efforts to broker a deal had failed (Kasinof 2012). He also requested safe passage out of the country. This engineered compromise helped to transfer power to President Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi, temporarily averted a slide into civil war, and opened

the possibility—albeit short-lived—of resolution (Toska 2012).

Success in prevention efforts relies on the presence and participation of leaders across all levels and segments of society, not just within the military or government. Leaders are needed in the private sector and among civil society. As social tensions deepen, it becomes critical to identify and support leadership that can mobilize needed social change at different levels and across sectors in a nonviolent manner, particularly to counter extreme narratives and ideologies. It is often “middle-range leadership”—ethnic or religious leaders, mayors, academic or intellectual leaders, or heads of prominent nongovernmental organizations—who wield power as interlocutors with excluded groups and the higher ranks of national leadership (Lederach 1997, 45). Investing in and supporting middle-range leaders is an important component of prevention.

Faith-based leaders can be particularly well placed to challenge violent narratives and, in particular, to prevent violent extremism within a culturally appropriate framework, as seen in Indonesia (Mirahmadi, Farooq, and Ziad 2012; box 6.2). In recognition of the critical role that such leaders play, some domestic actors have shifted attention to empowering moderate voices. Such leaders are less visible and therefore often have more room for maneuver and influence than those at the top of the power structure. In some contexts, these burgeoning or middle-range leaders are sidelined or imprisoned, as they may be perceived as representing a future threat to the established order.

Building Coalitions

Peaceful pathways have always required coalitions. Just as violent conflict mobilizes civil, government, military, religious, business, and social concerns to sustain violence, so too does preventive action. The comparative advantages, perspectives, relationships, and resources of each, across society and externally, have been instrumental for many

BOX 6.2 Community-Based Approaches to Preventing Violent Extremism

National approaches to preventing violent extremism have enjoyed some success where they have been rooted in the community and capitalized on the persuasive power and legitimacy of middle-range leaders. Trusted and influential voices within communities—such as women, religious scholars, youth leaders, and traditional chiefs—can help to educate the population and develop community-specific strategies for preventing violent extremism at the local level. Familiarity with the prevailing context, as well as the authority of and trust in these local formal and informal actors, has aided their efforts to provide peer-to-peer support and mentorship and to act as positive role models. Indeed, a recent investigation into extremism in Africa finds that recruits largely hold community and religious leaders in relatively high regard, as the custodians of informal, community-level institutions, while 78 percent of those interviewed reported having poor or zero trust in the police, military, and political elites (UNDP 2017).

Recruitment strategies vary by context, and violent extremist groups often spread by tapping into identity-based conflicts, mobilizing group-based grievances, and exploiting preexisting fractures in society. Weak states with limited presence over their territory and in their border regions can be particularly vulnerable to violent extremism. Amid growing recognition and acceptance that a solely security-based approach is insufficient and, in fact, may worsen the problem, governments also understand that the broader community context is important. Communities can play a role as incubators for potential extremists and as a source of recruits, just as they can act as a source of resilience. In particular, community-based approaches that focus on youth can be an effective part of a broader development plan or embedded in a program on slum upgrading in addition to more specific projects on rural or livestock development.

The influence of faith-based leaders in challenging narratives that can fuel

violent extremism has been seen in Indonesia, where the government worked with religious leaders and community organizations that had credibility with their constituents to counter efforts by extremist groups to spread violent messages. These social organizations were critical to coordinating activities on various levels. Based on the concept of *pancasila*, or culture, the strategy helped to establish a counternarrative to promote the separation of church and state and foster religious tolerance. One organization, LibForAll, enlisted celebrity singers to write songs to counter extremist narratives. The resulting album sold 7 million copies and reached the top of the music charts in Asia, giving the antiextremism messages weeks of high-level publicity (Ranstorp 2009).

The example of Morocco also highlights growing recognition of the power and sway of moderate voices in influencing incentives. The state has worked to prevent the spread of extremist ideologies and violence by bringing religious leaders closer to state institutions. The program has been credited with limiting the reach and damage of extremist narratives by providing strong incentives for local elites to join the state's project (Wainscott 2017). As a means of regulating religious narratives, the central government also took control of educational institutions that can confer the title of religious scholar (*alim*). The program included training women as "spiritual guides" (females cannot be *imams*) to lead prayers in community mosques and to combat extremist messages, placing special emphasis on the sacred role of women in families and communities (Bano and Kalmbach 2011).

Efforts to counter extremism in the Kyrgyz Republic have focused on the role of women in preventing violent extremism, with Women Leadership Schools in 16 target communities educating more than 80 women to act as religious leaders. The initiative, developed by the government in conjunction with

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BOX 6.2 Community-Based Approaches to Preventing Violent Extremism *(continued)*

a nongovernmental organization—Foundation Tolerance International—aims to strengthen participants’ community-level prevention and peacebuilding capacity, including identifying other women who could potentially be prone to radicalization and violent extremism. The initiative also includes outreach to wider community groups to collaborate on preventing violent extremism.

In Bangladesh, the government has funded efforts, run by civil society, to sensitize religious leaders in areas vulnerable to violent extremism, while also offering educational and financial support for the families of convicted extremists. The regions targeted have seen a reduction in extremist incidents, recruitment into extremist groups, and levels of local violence.

reasons: for example, sustaining prolonged action, gaining access to warring parties, acting as a vehicle for legitimate negotiations, monitoring commitments, or providing a network to identify, share, or mitigate risk.

Coalitions—both formal and informal—can involve any number and combination of actors, including civil society, private sector, and international actors. They can be effective in the immediate and short term in shifting and aligning incentives, while fostering a sense of collective ownership among disparate actors. Coalitions provide forums for resolving differences and a vehicle for actors to pull in the same direction. They can demonstrate unity of purpose and ensure that peace talks and leaders stay the course.

Coalitions are strengthened by wide-ranging participation from all corners of society. The uprising and political transition in Burkina Faso in 2014, dubbed the Burkina Spring, owes its peaceful character to the “determination and conciliation” of the Burkinabe people and an active and invested civil society backed by the international community (Fong 2017). President Blaise Compaore’s plans to change the constitution mobilized a vocal civil society opposition, and socially networked young people in the cities, religious groups, and even traditional chiefs who had historically been on the side of the ruling party came together. The combined weight of the the African Union, ECOWAS, and the United Nations in

support of the domestic push helped to shift the calculus of the military in favor of a civilian-led political transition and opened space for inclusive Burkinabe-led negotiations on the transition roadmap (Fong 2017).

At times, coalitions have drawn on the experience of countries with geographic proximity or common historical, cultural, or other linkages to influence incentives for initiating or perpetuating conflict. In the Middle East, specifically Tunisia, the Islamist party Ennahda learned from the mistakes made by the Muslim Brotherhood in the Arab Republic of Egypt, and notwithstanding the fact that it was relatively weaker and more inclined to compromise than the Muslim Brotherhood, it adopted a more participatory and accommodating approach (Toska 2017). In Jordan and Morocco, King Abdullah II and King Mohamed VI both moved rapidly and astutely to head off the popular protests of the Arab Spring by promising far-reaching reforms and signaling their receptiveness to demands for change, while at the same time playing to the fear of instability among the population (Toska 2017). The experiences of neighboring countries also loomed over the peace talks in Kenya in 2008, with observers to the mediation noting that the descent into genocide in Rwanda and the specter of decades-long conflict in Somalia were factors in giving impetus to talks when they flagged (Lindenmayer and Kaye 2009).

International and Regional Support for Coalitions

The Gambia is a case study of how African national, regional, and continental leaders, with the support of the United Nations, worked in concert to mobilize domestic and regional pressure for a peaceful transfer of power (Steven and Gerlach 2017). Hailed as a success of the regional preventive architecture, the effort was facilitated by coordination between internal and regional actors, led by ECOWAS, which balanced internal negotiations with diplomatic pressure. This engagement, backed by credible threats of military action, delivered clear preventive benefits in the immediate term and enabled longer-lasting, structural change, a task that would fall largely to domestic actors (Steven and Gerlach 2017).

In South Sudan, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development sought to provide an umbrella intervention ensuring that regional rivalries did not sabotage peace efforts (Verjee 2017). Although criticized for lack of results, the coalition it built constrained the pursuit of individual national interests by Sudan and Uganda, eliminated forum shopping by the parties, and produced a rare demonstration (albeit short-lived) of unity between all the regional actors, the African Union, and other international partners that led to the signing of a peace agreement in August 2015 (Verjee 2017).

Civil Society Actors in Coalitions

Civil society plays a strong role in fostering social cohesion and collective action for peaceful pathways (Aslam 2017) by building relationships across groups in everyday interactions. For example, analysis of interethnic and intraethnic ties in India finds that interethnic organizations are more effective at preventing the escalation of communal violence than intraethnic organizations, because they strengthen social and civic ties (Varshney 2002).⁸ This social trust forms the basis for collective action. Several large-sample studies have demonstrated that civil society mobilization tends to be overwhelmingly peaceful

and oftentimes more successful than movements that employ violence:

- A cross-country study of the 25 largest social mobilization campaigns between 1900 and 2006 shows that nonviolent movements achieve their objectives at least half of the time compared with 26 percent of the time for movements that turn to violence (Stephan and Chenoweth 2011).
- The greater the support that nonviolent movements can muster, the higher the chances that governments will seek accommodation, as seen in Serbia⁹ in 2000 (Sombatpoonsiri 2015) and Ukraine in 2004 (Binnendijk and Marovic 2006; Zunes, Hardy, and Stephan 2010), and that security actors will choose to side with the nonviolent campaign (Dahl, Gates, and Nygård 2017).
- A global study of transitions from authoritarianism between 1972 and 2005 finds that nonviolent civic resistance was a key factor driving 50 of 67 transitions; it finds that transitions driven by civic resistance led to more and greater increases in political rights and civil liberties than did transitions that were elite-driven or transitions in which the political opposition engaged in violence (Karatnycky and Ackerman 2005; Zunes, Hardy, and Stephan 2010).

Civil society groups often play important roles in peace processes by increasing accountability among conflicting parties and potentially endowing the process with greater public credibility (Chataway 1998; Lanz 2011; Wanis-St. John and Kew 2008). Given the role that perceptions of exclusion play in increasing the risk of violence, several studies have shown that bringing civil society groups into peace negotiations or decision making can increase the chances of addressing the underlying causes of the conflict rather than focusing solely on managing the risk of immediate violence or the postwar distribution of power (Barnes 2005; Nilsson 2012; Paffenholz et al. 2017; Saunders 1999). Analysis of the impact of including civil society in peace

negotiations shows that such inclusion is associated with greater durability of peace agreements:

- In Liberia, civil society groups were involved from the early stages of the civil war in trying to end hostilities, with faith-based groups among the first to intervene (Marc, Verjee, and Mogaka 2015). Women's groups campaigned actively against wartime rape and advocated on behalf of women's issues, while local and international civil society groups worked to defuse tensions at various junctures. Civil society was initially confined to the sidelines of the Liberian peace process, which contributed, in part, to flawed agreements that only reflected the interests of combatants (Marc, Verjee, and Mogaka 2015). Their eventual inclusion in the Accra peace talks in 2003 was due to widespread recognition of their contribution in making peace deals stick and the desire to represent the interests of a wide range of groups in society. Civil society was also ultimately included in the power-sharing agreement that emerged from those talks (Marc, Verjee, and Mogaka 2015).
- In Sierra Leone, too, the Inter-Religious Council of Sierra Leone played an active role in building confidence and trust between the government and rebels, during and after the 1991–2002 civil war there, and is credited with preventing the emergence of religious schisms in such a fraught environment (Marc, Verjee, and Mogaka 2015).

Inclusive coalitions consisting of civil society actors can also incentivize peaceful dialogue that can foster trust, hold different actors to account, and mobilize collective action. Civil society can provide a vehicle to mobilize groups around common values, purposes, and interests and to foster convergence across social cleavages and religious boundaries:

- The Tunisian Nobel Peace Prize–winning Quartet coalition represented a wide range of sectors and values in Tunisian civil society: working life and welfare,

principles of the rule of law, and human rights (Toska 2017). It was formed in 2011 to advance peaceful democratic development, just as the democratization process risked collapse. The Quartet brokered a national dialogue between the governing administration and the opposition, which resulted in a roadmap to new elections. Tunisia's strong civil society tradition and this broad spectrum of interests gave the Quartet moral authority in exercising its mediation role (World Bank 2015b). The Quartet was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2015 "for its decisive contribution to the building of a pluralistic democracy in Tunisia in the wake of the Jasmine Revolution of 2011" (Norwegian Nobel Committee 2015).

- Before the conflict degenerated, youth organizations in the Republic of Yemen—some financed by the private sector—connected young people to one another for social support and help in searching for jobs, dealing with financial problems, and organizing community activities. These practices can instill a sense of cooperation, solidarity, and public spirit among participants and can help individuals to develop organizing, mobilizing, and problem-solving skills (Marc et al. 2012, 106).

Private Sector Presence in Coalitions

Peacebuilding organizations have increasingly identified the potential of private sector actors to work for peace and are seeking innovative ways by which to mobilize them to this end as part of coalitions. International Alert, for instance, works with private sector companies with the aim of helping a country to "turn its back on conflict and move towards lasting peace" (Wennmann 2017, 8). It has also issued guidance to help extractive companies to understand and manage better the risks of working in contexts of conflict and violence (International Alert 2005).

Participation by the business community as peace mediators and in conflict prevention has reaped results in contexts including Nepal, the Philippines, Rwanda, South Caucasus, Sri Lanka, and Uganda

(Wennmann 2017). In South Africa, a movement led by business leaders facilitated the country's transition from the apartheid era to a multiracial state. The Consultative Business Movement was born in August 1988, forged from an understanding that the traditional methods of interaction adopted by the business community with mainly black unions and political leaders were "inadequate" (Ganson 2017, 5). During 1988 and 1989, the movement initiated broad-based bilateral consultations with political parties, civil society, the media, and private sector actors. Together with the South African Council of Churches, it convened a process that led to the 1991 National Peace Accord, which set the stage for constitutional negotiations and put into motion South Africa's transition to democracy (Ganson 2017). In this case, the private sector was able to act as a "stabilizing agent" in the transition because it occupied the space between the apartheid regime and the African National Congress and thus could credibly promote dialogue, trust building, and consensus building.

The private sector can exert its influence within society to sue for peace in various ways and help to influence actors' incentives toward a peaceful pathway. In Kenya, private sector actors skillfully deployed their leverage and influence during the 2007–08 postelection crisis for peaceful ends (Luke and Wennmann 2017). The long-standing patronage system that has fostered strong bonds between actors in the private and public sectors gave business leaders an edge lacking in other actors (Bigsten and Moene 1996; Hope 2014). On this basis, private sector actors such as the Kenya Private Sector Alliance intervened to help to end the crisis and have since continued to engage in peacebuilding activities by funding peace forums, preventing incitement, disseminating conciliatory narratives, negotiating privately with political leaders, organizing presidential debates, and maintaining neutrality (Goldstein and Rotich 2008; Materu 2015; Owuor and Wisor 2014; Wachira, Arendshorst, and Charles 2010). Similarly, in Northern Ireland, the Confederation of Business Industry and other business associations formed the Group of Seven, which used

media and publicity campaigns to highlight the benefits of a peace dividend and pushed for a resolution to the conflict (Peschka 2011).

As private sector activity cuts across all socioeconomic strata, it can also help to foster inclusion and social cohesion and to address grievances related to socioeconomic exclusion:

- In Sri Lanka, a group of members from regional chambers of commerce across the country promoted joint initiatives between Muslim, Sinhalese, and Tamil businesses as well as policy advocacy (Peschka 2011).
- In the Philippines, La Frutera and Paglas Corporation set up a banana plantation in a marginalized area and employed Christian and Muslim workers, some of whom were former combatants, and thus helped to promote religious tolerance and reconciliation (International Alert 2006).
- In Colombia, the Footprints of Peace project, run by the Federación Nacional de Cafeteros coffee guild, worked to build local peace between 2011 and 2015 in some of the country's most violent areas (Miklian 2016). It succeeded in mitigating some risks of conflict through "community development, economic engagement, and reconciliation-based peacebuilding" (Miklian 2016, 3).

Transparency and accountability are critical to ensure responsible business conduct and conflict prevention. The absence of information on the origin of output from firms doing business in fragile countries or on the use of revenue from their sales generates scope for illicit activities that contribute to the continuation of conflicts. Larger local and multinational firms can be subjected to such screenings—because of their operations—outside of the fragile states themselves. Information and certification can eliminate revenue from firms that cut corners with regard to social standards or that channel resources toward illicit activities. The Kimberley Process is one of the first such certification schemes to develop greater transparency in financial flows, with mixed results so far. Regulatory provisions

within the 1977 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act in the United States, the 2010 Bribery Act in the United Kingdom, or similar regulation adopted recently by the EU on “conflict minerals” require importers to carry out due diligence and monitor their supply chains to prevent the financing of armed groups and human rights abuses. Similar initiatives focusing on human trafficking and slavery have also been introduced recently in California and the United Kingdom, requiring firms to disclose their efforts to monitor and prevent these

activities within their supply chains. At the level of governments, 52 countries have also implemented the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) standard requiring them to disclose annually information on how the revenue from natural resources makes its way through the government and how it contributes to social spending. Dependence on foreign demand where issues are sensitive can also be a powerful tool for responsible business conduct and conflict prevention, as long as there is a flow of information on firms operating in sensitive markets (box 6.3).

BOX 6.3 Private Sector Contributions to Peacebuilding

The private sector has contributed to peacebuilding in various ways. In addition to their role as mediators and promoters of economic stability, private sector actors often adopt conflict-sensitive business practices. These practices require firms to desist from contributing to conflict dynamics, human rights violations, corruption, or any type of criminal activity. Impetus to observe such practices comes from growing recognition that being perceived to fuel or contribute to conflict can have commercial, reputational, and financial repercussions. Private businesses can operate in a conflict-sensitive manner by adapting to the local context and incorporating an understanding of conflict risks and a philosophy of “do no harm” into their operations. The private sector contributes to prevention when it aligns its activities with the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), for example, by adhering to the UN Guiding Principles for Business and Human Rights or joining the UN Global Compact, which helps companies align their strategies and operations with universal principles of human rights, labor, the environment, and anticorruption.

Some multinational firms have responded to reputational risk from public relations scandals or environmental disasters by developing stringent rules, while others have responded to global

pressure by adopting a more socially conscious outlook. Over the years, some leading firms have gradually shifted their strategies from running “safe operations” (protecting their own employees and assets) to building “safe communities” (taking action to address conflict risks in local communities). One example of such an approach is the Niger Delta Partnership Initiative, established in 2010, to which Chevron committed millions of dollars of investment and leveraged additional funds from donor agencies (Chevron Corporation 2014). An independent assessment after six years found that its programs had helped to achieve widespread change by bringing international attention and private investment to the Niger delta. This oil-rich region has suffered the effects of extensive environmental damage from extractive industries, which has affected the livelihoods of the local populations. The partnership’s greatest impact has been in development and peacebuilding, creating a positive environment for economic growth and peace to take hold. While some companies have gone beyond the minimum standard, the incentives for this type of behavior do not always exist in companies that are operating in emerging economies or that are smaller in size and not at the mercy of the same sort of reputational risks as large multinational companies.

Sources: Ganson and Wennmann 2012, 13; Gifford et al. 2016.

Influencing Narratives and Norms

Whether enshrined in law or followed as a social practice, norms are among the most powerful forces by which to influence incentives. Norms provide a shared framework through which actors and leaders can manage contestation in an equitable manner, including through the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, and thus reduce the risk of conflict becoming violent. Norms are often undergirded by narratives that appeal to core values and notions related to constructs of identity, making them a potent force both for prevention and for mobilization toward violence.

Given the well-recognized power of narrative to amplify values and norms in support of either peace or violence, leaders and those lobbying them have often looked to craft or sway narrative as a way to shift incentives (Sargsyan 2017). Narratives can draw on values of identity, belonging, rights, territory, or culture. They can be called on to respond to signs of conflict or to carve out an alternative pathway (Zartman 2015).

Many state and civil society actors have used narratives to strengthen norms of social cohesion and tolerance. Some countries have made notable efforts and investments to counter the destructive effects of narratives that can act as an echo chamber and reinforce exclusionary and violent narratives:

- With international support, Ghana's National Commission on Civic Education has engaged political party representatives in all 275 constituencies on peace, civic, and voter responsibilities, aiming to change the image and dialogue regarding electoral violence (Hounkpe and Bucyana 2014). Following the troubled 2012 elections in Ghana, a body-builder group called Macho Men for Peace and Justice promoted a narrative to change the image of "macho men" from the stereotype of thugs for hire at the bidding of corrupt politicians to constructive protectors of peace and democracy (Bob-Milliar 2017).

- The Media Foundation for West Africa's monitoring of hate speech and indecent campaign language is testament to the negative power of narrative and the need to reinforce efforts to counter it (Tietaah 2014).
- An examination of the blogosphere in Pakistan finds that, while peacebuilding efforts on the Internet might not match the level of blogging activity seen by extremists, peaceful social coalitions of citizens can and do emerge in the Internet space (Naseem, Arshad-Ayaz, and Doyle 2017).

Narratives have significant power to work for negative ends, too, and can be manipulated to engineer a context that encourages violence. This was exemplified in the insidious effects of hate speech or "coded language" that was used to deadly effect in Kenya during the preelection violence of 2007–08 and in Rwanda during the genocide in 1994 to deepen fissures in society, delegitimize certain groups within society, and justify the use of violence against them (Somerville 2011). Often, this speech is perpetuated by leaders and influential actors and disseminated through social and broadcast media (Deb, Donohue, and Glaisyer 2017).

The Internet is playing an increasingly influential role in transmitting and spreading hate speech, and this has led to a much-debated push in some countries, including Kenya and South Africa, toward greater regulation (Nyathi and Rajuili 2017). The more recent phenomenon of "fake news" experienced in many countries, including Germany and the United States, is another example of how information can be manipulated or instrumentalized to reinforce a certain narrative and further an agenda or attain a specific objective (Gu, Kropotov, and Yarochkin 2017).

New norms and values have arisen during conflict and changed the pathway of a society:

- South Africa has worked hard to foster an inclusive historical narrative as a direct way of restoring and nurturing social cohesion (Sisk 2017). As one example of

many steps taken as a result of national leadership that articulated agendas of reconciliation, equality, and justice, the country has celebrated December 16 as a Day of Reconciliation and a public holiday since 1995, instead of using the day to commemorate war and symbols of division (Sargsyan 2017).

- Niger, too, has reinforced a national narrative of social cohesion, peace, and tolerance by building on some of the unique characteristics of Nigerien society. In times of crisis, the country's leadership leverages this sense of solidarity as a way of managing and mitigating tensions between groups (Pérouse de Montclos 2017).

Narratives and norms can be institutionalized and have a more sustainable impact on pathways to peace by promoting civic values and a culture of peace through peace education,¹⁰ civic education, public memorialization, and arts and culture (UNHRC 2016). Reflexively promoting civic values and strengthening a sense of citizenship can help to maintain and safeguard institutions. When citizens regard the state and social institutions as effective in protecting their rights and delivering services, they will see themselves as a part of public life and promote a sense of common well-being (Brennan 2017; UNDP 2016).

Domestic actors have strategically used global norms, particularly human rights norms, but the 2030 Agenda also provides entry points for rallying support behind a push for change or warding off pressure from contesting forces:

- For the Kyrgyz Republic, government's public declaration of its intention and efforts to strengthen human rights protections helped to reinforce domestic and international support in the face of regional political pressures (Logvinenko 2017). A desire to be seen as abiding by human rights norms also formed the basis for a robust mission of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to Nepal in 2005 (von Einsiedel and Salih 2017).

- The government of Nepal signed an agreement with the high commissioner for human rights to establish an office with a far-reaching mandate on human rights. The mission aimed to reduce impunity on both sides of the conflict and to strengthen the national capacity to protect human rights. Its presence is credited with helping to lessen abuses, torture, and disappearances and with encouraging both sides to do more to limit civilian deaths. It also engaged with nonstate actors and opened opportunities to promote inclusion, equality, and dialogue among parties to the conflict (von Einsiedel and Salih 2017).

Gender norms can also be called on to mitigate tensions and promote peace. One of the best-known examples is that of Liberian women evoking norms of masculinity to pressure men to continue peace negotiations and empowering women in their traditional conflict resolution roles (Marc, Verjee, and Mogaka 2015). Women came together to institutionalize a more permanent way of mediating local disputes and preventing violence, while nurturing an ethic of peace and fostering social cohesion (Alaga 2010; box 6.4).

Development and peacebuilding institutions have, in recent decades, placed a greater priority on mobilizing women's efforts for peace, drawing on the roles they often play in society as connectors and trust builders. National action plans for the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325, designed to increase women's participation in dialogue and peacebuilding, draw on this role, while efforts to prevent violent extremism often focus on women as critical actors for moderating extremist messages and preventing radicalization (Sisk 2017; UN Security Council 2000). As discussed in chapter 4, preexisting gender and power norms heavily influence the space and weight accorded to women's participation in peacemaking (Nygard et al. 2017), which makes consideration of such norms, particularly in a domestic context, critical to successful prevention.

BOX 6.4 Cost Savings of Investing in Women’s Grassroots Prevention: Female-Led Peace Huts in Liberia

Women peace activists in Liberia started peace huts shortly after the end of the civil war in 2003. An adaptation of the traditional *palava* hut, women in peace huts mediate local disputes, monitor the police and justice services, refer victims of violence to counseling and other services, and raise awareness within communities regarding peacebuilding priorities, such as elections, decentralization, and natural resource concessions. According to the local police, peace huts have been key to reducing and even preventing violence in the community because they defuse tensions and alert police to potential outbreaks of conflict. A study was commissioned to look at the effectiveness of peace huts and to compare the modest investment in establishing and maintaining them to the costs of addressing violence once it breaks out. The total financial cost of peace huts is small, amounting to an estimated US\$1.5 million per year, or approximately US\$62,000 per hut per year, including the expense of establishing the hut, building capacity, and conducting training and monitoring. In comparison to the US\$10 billion cost of overall peacekeeping and foreign aid or the US\$95 million in domestic financial resources incurred by the justice sector per year, peace huts constitute a minor investment with significant potential cost savings. This study found the following:

Sources: Douglas 2014; Fall 2017.

- Peace huts reduce the workload of the police and justice systems by handling disputes and interpersonal conflicts before they require intervention by the security sector.
- Peace huts link traditional redress mechanisms and the formal justice system by facilitating reporting of serious cases and improving access to justice when required.
- Women working with peace huts have established connections with political leaders and opened avenues for improving women’s participation in decision making.
- Peace huts are more sustainable and resilient than similar initiatives, including throughout the Ebola crisis, due in part to their indigenous and grassroots nature.
- The proximity of peace huts to the community means that their efforts directly respond to pressing security issues at the local level.

The study suggests that a low-cost, local, and women-led intervention fulfills important roles in the community, including conflict mediation, community policing, awareness raising, and sensitization. These roles fill a gap where communities lack immediate access to state justice mechanisms such as the police and judicial system.

Several countries have drawn on global norms regarding human rights, tolerance, and inclusion through sports programming to build trust and cohesion. Particularly in postconflict settings, sports are seen as both a *method* of programming for reconciliation and development work (such as youth livelihood development) and a *symbolic metaphor* for peaceful coexistence and indeed “normality” in social relations. Practically, sports are used to

spread the values of human rights, dignity, inclusion, and participation of all and the peaceful resolution of disputes. Recent research from Northern Ireland shows that appropriately designed sports interventions can help to overcome problems of symbolic competition and territorial segregation with the representation of new, less distinct, and divided identities (Mitchell, Summerville, and Hargie 2016).

Addressing Institutional Weaknesses

Efforts to address institutions' shortcomings for peace constitute the second broad area for action on sustained prevention. As the "immune system" of a society (World Bank 2011, 72), effective institutions strengthen resilience to shocks and enhance the capacity for peaceful mitigation of conflict. Institutions provide the regulatory framework, both formal and informal, governing actors' behavior and limiting the harm individuals and groups can inflict. The quality and legitimacy of institutions reflect social relationships in broader society, and institutions evolve together with those relationships. In contexts with deep tensions across groups, institutions may be more exclusionary, more biased, and less trusted by underrepresented groups. Reform of institutions, therefore, presents an important opportunity for prevention.

Across the country cases prepared for this study, efforts to increase the representativeness and reach of institutions have tended to see a reduction in the risk of violent conflict. However, as the country cases show, reform efforts can run into obstacles and experience setbacks and reversals, as groups contest processes of change. This underscores the lesson that *how* institutions are reformed matters at least as much as *what* technical reforms are implemented.

Implementing Power-Sharing Arrangements and Temporary Mechanisms

Broadening and improving political inclusion¹¹ at the national level is a key plank in virtually every successful case of effective long-term prevention and also is reflected in the 2030 Agenda, including SDGs 10 and 16. As described in chapters 4 and 5, increasing access to the power and governance arena creates strong disincentives for violence, especially when power-sharing arrangements are enshrined in formal agreements, such as new constitutions. Over time, the benefits of political inclusion, such as increased influence, greater access

to information, and the means to pursue collective interests nonviolently, can have a powerful effect on actors' incentives for prevention:

- In Northern Ireland, the experience of gaining influence through participating in political discourse and seeing the utility of compromise strengthened Sinn Fein's motivation to invest in more peaceful conflict resolution processes (Walsh 2017).
- In Ghana, greater political inclusion and openness created an enabling environment not only for a robust political opposition to form and unrepresented groups to participate, but also for a vibrant civil society to emerge and security sector reform to take place (Bob-Milliar 2017; Steven and Gerlach 2017).
- Colombia's more local-level, informal bargaining process between nonstate actors helped to implement demobilization. Thus, nontraditional and informal mechanisms of inclusion and outsourcing can also help to maintain regime stability and create an alternative kind of order that enables the conditions for averting immediate threats of violence (Ahram 2011).

In all countries, however, taking the further step of institutionalizing changes through reform of state institutions is what laid the foundation for lasting peace. Negotiated roadmaps, peace agreements, and postconflict settlements have often provided platforms for a renegotiation of institutional arrangements and provided public signals of intentions for reform, creating space for longer-term change. Enshrining them in institutions helps to ensure that they last over time:

- Ghana's new constitution ensured the empowerment of minority and marginalized ethnic groups within substantive local decision-making structures (Steven and Gerlach 2017).
- Northern Ireland established an elected assembly, structured to ensure power sharing across divided groups (Walsh 2017).

- Meanwhile, in South Africa, gradual increases in political inclusion helped the country to navigate long-held structural and racial divides (Daly and Sarkin 2007).
- In Tunisia, the national dialogue forum that helped Islamists and the secular government to overcome an increasingly violent stalemate and agree on a roadmap going forward also served as a platform for compromise, including a new constitution guaranteeing fundamental rights for the entire population irrespective of gender, political conviction, or religious beliefs (Norwegian Nobel Committee 2015; Steven and Gerlach 2017). Islamist leaders reached out to the secular camp to strike compromises on difficult issues such as the role of Shari’ah in the constitution and gender equality.

Both Burkina Faso and Tunisia also demonstrated inclusion by explicitly including past politicians, even from rival groups, in politics rather than excluding or prosecuting them (Pichler Fong 2017; Toska 2017). For Tunisia, this broadened accountability for a peaceful political transition, while giving the transition team access to institutional memory and a wealth of prior experience (Toska 2017). In Burkina Faso, although not popular with civil society leaders, the move to

include moderate elements of the former ruling party meant that the Charter of the Transition was more inclusive and that the reconciliation process had broader buy-in (Pichler Fong 2017).

One of the factors that has helped Niger to maintain relative stability in a region beset by security crises has been the move to institutionalize greater political inclusion at the national level. The transition from a military regime to an inclusive civilian-led regime in 2011 saw a change in Niger’s fortunes and helped to maintain stability in the face of various internal and external threats (Pérouse de Montclos 2017). The new president, Mahamadou Issoufou, ushered in a parliamentary regime that extended political inclusion to a range of groups and parties, including naming various opposition leaders to government posts and appointing a Tuareg, Brigi Rafini, to the post of prime minister in 2011 (Pérouse de Montclos 2017). The inclusion offered by the new government helped it to maintain an elite pact and also helped Niger to address specific grievances among the population and to develop greater accountability (box 6.5).

To be meaningful, inclusion needs to go deeper than mere participation. It should lead to an increased focus on the core issues that are central to managing risks and that

BOX 6.5 Niger: An Example of Resilience in a Troubled Neighborhood

Niger faces the threat of extremist groups on its border with Mali, is exposed to the lawless Sahara interior through its border with Libya and northern Mali, and has seen repeated incursions by Boko Haram into its territory from Nigeria in the south. Internally too, it has experienced two military coups in recent years, tensions with its Toubou and Tuareg populations have exacerbated internal divides in the past, and its battle with Boko Haram in

the southeast and with armed groups from Mali in the southwest have stoked intercommunal tensions and deepened tensions over access to resources. Despite these risks, Niger has managed to remain stable over the last decade. The following factors help to explain how the country has managed to avoid sliding into open, violent conflict.

Fostering a sense of national unity. Niger has a robust national narrative regarding social cohesion. A grassroots

(Box continued next page)

BOX 6.5 Niger: An Example of Resilience in a Troubled Neighborhood *(continued)*

rural development program fostered by President Mahamadou Issoufou has strengthened the state's relationship with communities and increased its legitimacy. The separation of the church and state during colonial times helped to give rise to a secular state and a context that has partially contained the emergence of radical Islamist ideology. The state supports secularism but also engages in an active dialogue with religious authorities, with Islam playing a central role in Niger. The religious community has supported conflict mitigation activities in the southwest since 2011; today, most religious actors in the southeast reject the Islamist narrative of Boko Haram. However, this rejection has not entirely mitigated the risk of radicalization toward violent extremism among the youth. Overall, the combination of historical, economic, and religious factors in Niger has helped to contain a further polarization of groups along the north-south divide and diluted the appeal of extremist ideologies. The leadership has used these factors to build a narrative of peace and tolerance. At the local level, the wide dispersal of Niger's Tuareg population across the country, living and intermarrying with different communities, has also contributed to cohesive social dynamics.

Forging a development, security, and diplomacy nexus. Niger has engaged in a major push to forge a strong nexus between development, security, and diplomacy. The army in Niger is well trained and, on the whole, has a positive relationship with the population. It has made efforts to work with civilian authorities, especially with structures such as the Haute Autorité à la Consolidation de la Paix (HACP). The comprehensive economic and social development plan includes components on security and conflict resolution. A US\$2.5 billion strategy for the security and development of the Sahara-Sahel region proposes an integrated approach to security and development and includes issues like pastoralism development and management of local conflicts related

to transhumance activities. Finally, a recovery plan for the Diffa region, which has suffered the effects of Boko Haram attacks, is currently being drafted and contains elements related to security, humanitarian assistance, and longer-term development.

Boosting political inclusion. Measures to boost political inclusion include the absorption of Tuaregs into the public sector and into administrative positions. The appointment of Brigi Rafini, a Tuareg leader, as prime minister in Niamey and the placement of a Tuareg as head of the HACP have helped to foster a sense of inclusion that cuts across divides, as have the election and appointment of some Tuareg leaders to local governance positions. The inclusion of dominant local elites and minority representatives at all levels has helped to achieve stability. This stability is a product of both the elite pact that lasted between 2011 and 2015, which ensured a fair distribution of power and rents between elites, as well as a tradition of nationalist sentiment that has helped to keep elites integrated and united. At the national level, Niger introduced multiparty politics in 1991 and returned to a parliamentary system in 2011, following the end of a military hiatus that lasted from 2010 to 2011.

Promoting early warning and mediation. Niger has developed an original mechanism for early warning and mediation that it implements through the HACP, which was created in October 2011 and replaces a previous similar structure. The HACP reports directly to the presidency and administers a range of programs, including intercommunal dialogue, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants, and development projects aimed at promoting peace and cohesion. The early warning mechanism supports early mediation through a network of local and community actors—some of whom are hired by the HACP as *chargés de mission*—who report back to the president of the HACP when there are signs of heightened tension in a particular region or community. It is highly dynamic and coordinates activities

(Box continued next page)

BOX 6.5 Niger: An Example of Resilience in a Troubled Neighborhood *(continued)*

closely with the army as well as with the various sectoral ministries, local administration, and traditional authorities. Despite the informal character of the early warning and early response mechanism, its ability and capacity for rapid intervention and its holistic approach have been key to preventing violence in Niger.

Addressing socioeconomic grievances. The Renaissance socioeconomic plan—a high-level platform of reforms—that was put forward by President Issoufou when he was first elected in 2011 aims to address socioeconomic grievances. Within this, the 3N Initiative (the Nigeriens Nourish the Nigeriens) serves as a framework to enhance the resilience of

those affected by crises, and a warning system has been established to prevent and manage food crises and natural disasters. In 2006, the government passed a law to redistribute 15 percent of revenues from extractive industries back to the communes where the mining takes place. However, this mechanism is contested and has not yet been implemented, mostly because of the lack of capacity to manage resources at the central level and the dwindling of mining resources. The decision by the government not to obstruct the functioning of the informal economy that provides a vital source of livelihoods for many has helped to build resilience and social cohesion across the country, particularly in the border regions.

Sources: Antil and Mokhefi 2014; Guichaoua and Pellerin 2017; ICG 2013, 2017; Pérouse de Montclos 2017; World Bank 2016b.

build confidence for further progress. The pressure for a regime to survive or persist can incentivize temporary mechanisms for inclusion over institutional reform. Inclusion through the redistribution of favors, privileges, or some control of the use of force can reduce tensions and increase incentives to refrain from violence. However, this redistribution can come at the expense of a comprehensive reform of institutions or improved state capacity and, ultimately, lasting prevention:

- For example, the Republic of Yemen's 2013 National Dialogue Conference ultimately failed to bring about much-needed structural changes, despite being hailed as an inclusive and representative process that brought in the political elite, traditional leaders, the Houthis, the southern militant group Al Hirak, civil society, and women's and youth groups (Steven and Gerlach 2017). Although the process agreed on a draft document and wide-ranging recommendations, the decision by a small presidential panel

to divide the Republic of Yemen into a federation of six geographic entities perceived to enjoy unequal access to resources ultimately contributed to an escalation of violence and a full-fledged military conflict (Steven and Gerlach 2017).

- In the Democratic Republic of Congo, successive political regimes since the 1970s have relied on alternative strategies for political survival, such as patronage, corruption, aid, and mineral extraction, among others (Bøås et al. 2017).

Ultimately, though, without corresponding improvements in state capability, efficiency, and accountability or efforts to lay the groundwork for a more durable settlement, prevention is unlikely to be sustained. Such arrangements have tended to work only so long as the pool of elites to co-opt is of a manageable size, incentives remain aligned, or the arrangements have the backing of a strong or canny leader. In Côte d'Ivoire, for example, the founding president, Felix Houphouët-Boigny, ran an

inclusive government and promoted national cohesion for decades through patronage mechanisms and temporary elite pacts (Marc, Verjee, and Mogaka 2015). However, the stability conferred by this arrangement came to an end following his death, contributing to the country's eventual descent into civil war.

Gender inclusion has proven a powerful element in helping to ensure that processes move beyond dialogue to meaningful change. UN Security Council Resolution 1325 articulates this approach and has enabled global norms on gender equality to influence many peace negotiations as well as broader development plans in a manner that goes beyond the simple inclusion of women at the table (OSAGI 2000; UN Security Council 2000). It provides international backing for greater women's leadership in decision making at the national, regional, and international levels. This backing has contributed to the credibility and durability of many peace agreements (O'Reilly, Ó Súilleabháin, and Paffenholz 2015).

Attempting supportive institutional reforms to sustain prevention can also come up against serious challenges. In the case of many such states, efforts to reform institutions have disrupted the precarious balance of power established by the patrimonial state. Development partners and the international community face the conundrum of either supporting such states for the temporary stability they can provide or attempting to encourage reforms that may incur instability via the process of change. The lessons in many cases, however, highlight that whether reforms are managed or imposed, reform is a fundamental part of sustaining peace.

The monarchies in Jordan and Morocco withstood the revolutions that swept the Middle East through the Arab Spring in part due to the plausible promise of political and economic reforms and the prospect of those reforms translating into real inclusion (Toska 2017). Both countries also rely on access to rents in the form of foreign aid as one means of maintaining stability, and their kings are protected, in part, by the dual elected and royal structure of their states.

These structures allow concessions to greater political reform, without undermining or threatening elites, and promote stability, at least while the arrangements endure (Toska 2017).

Decentralizing Power, Services, and Resources

As discussed in chapter 5, the decentralization¹² of power and resources to local and federal levels has been a significant force for preventing and mitigating conflict (Nygard et al. 2017). It represents a practical demonstration of reforms that boost political and social inclusion. Decentralization usually requires fundamental and, often, extensive institutional changes that have the power to address underlying conflict risks, shift actors' incentives, and navigate structural constraints to peace. It is therefore not without risks. In Ghana and Kenya, decentralization transferred greater resources and control to historically marginalized regions (Bob-Milliar 2017; Mogaka 2017):

- In Ghana, a gradual increase in transfers of funds from the central to local government, in particular, to poorer districts in the northern region, took place over a decade (Bob-Milliar 2017). The process was set in motion by President Jerry Rawlings and ratified four years later in the 1992 constitution. The president retained some powers, but the Regional Coordinating Councils, district assemblies, and even subnational bodies all have meaningful powers of decision making and resource distribution.
- Kenya's extensive program of devolution, adopted under its 2010 constitution, was aimed, in part, at addressing concerns related to perceptions of fairness and political inclusion in the multiethnic state (Mogaka 2017). It established 47 county governments and redistributed resources across the country, in a move that gave the historically marginalized north and northeast of the country control over its political and economic destiny for the first time. In 2013, new county governors and assemblies were elected, creating a new tier of government. Spatial diffusion

of power and resources to the counties offers the country's marginalized regions the opportunity for rapid development directed by local priorities.

In both cases, the focus was on fostering a sense of political inclusion at local levels. In Kenya, the National Cohesion and Integration Commission was established to ease concerns that the tendency to centralize national structures would be mirrored at the county level; it also helped to facilitate discussions on political cohesion in local communities (Mogaka 2017). A sense of political inclusion was reinforced through the so-called "negotiated democracy" model, whereby some counties brokered deals to ensure adequate community representation in positions of leadership, enabling individuals to vote across ethnic lines with the expectation that their community would be adequately represented regardless (Mogaka 2017).

Where decentralization has worked well, control of power and resources has been traded, first, to manage frustrations stemming from horizontal inequalities and long-standing tensions relating to exclusion from political power (Nygard et al. 2017) and, second, to manage resources more efficiently. While decentralization has been instrumental in averting potential violence or diffusing ongoing violence, it has also created short-run risks for violent conflict. This is particularly the case where elite competition is transferred to the local level or local governments lack legitimacy (Nygard et al. 2017):

- An extensive decentralization program in Indonesia in 2001 led to major transfers of administrative, political, and financial authority to district and municipal levels (box 6.6). In the short term, the devolution of power and funds increased opportunities for contestation at the local level, as groups jockeyed to position themselves favorably during the process (Bertrand 2004). Once implemented, decentralization heightened the stakes for access to resources from the central government, and political elites exploited

ethnic identity as a way to mobilize their bases (Jaffrey 2017). After 2004, however, the country moved into a stabilization phase, which was attributed to public satisfaction with decentralization, greater space for the expression of local identities, greater levels of state penetration, effective design of local elections, and strong leadership and institutional frameworks at the local level (Steven and Gerlach 2017).

- In Kenya, too, devolution brought challenges (Mogaka 2017). The absence of existing "rules of the game," combined with the scale of resource flows, created and exacerbated local-level contestations. It heightened the stakes of political office at the local level and raised the specter of violence around elections at the county level. Balancing the way in which power in the counties is shared by elites from different communities remains a significant challenge (World Bank 2017c).

Where decentralization has failed to take effect, the failure is largely because it has been implemented incompletely or because political actors and leaders have had little or no incentive to see such wide-ranging changes take effect. Decentralization in Mali, although viewed as the main vehicle for conflict prevention, did not achieve its aims due to incomplete implementation amid "considerable resistance to change from officials at central and regional levels who stand to lose power when the capacity of local authorities is increased" (Bøås et al. 2017). The resulting unmet expectations and grievances undermined state legitimacy. The Central African Republic's small Bangui-based elite is an example of how entrenched interests can block attempts at reform: the lack of state presence outside the capital should be addressed ahead of any decentralization attempt (Lombard 2017). In Afghanistan, where competition for devolved resources or power is high, the perseverance of warlords and local strongmen, as well as weak or no state presence, increased local-level corruption, which fed into local grievances and reinforced conflict.¹³

BOX 6.6 Decentralization and Security Reform as Prevention in Practice: Indonesia

Indonesia has undergone cycles of violence and repression, with four secessionist conflicts waged between 1999 and 2004, as the country transitioned from decades of authoritarian rule toward democracy and economic and political stability. The conflicts were due to an array of long-standing historical issues. Each was intensified by Indonesia's deep economic crisis in the late 1990s and widespread political uncertainty following President Hajji Suharto's sudden resignation.

Among Indonesia's subnational conflicts, Timor-Leste's struggle for independence became known, in part, for the violent referendum of 1999, whereby a strong-arm military response left up to 1,000 people dead and a quarter of the population dispersed. A temporary UN administration took over, and recognition of the outcome of the referendum by the Indonesian Parliament led to eventual independence in 2002. The negotiated peace processes of the other three conflicts—Aceh, Central Sulawesi, and Maluku—are considered to have been relatively successful, although those, too, where not without violence. While Indonesia continues to struggle with episodes of subnational violence, including in Papua's "postconflict" areas, two effective prevention strategies have had well-demonstrated success: decentralizing power and resources and paying attention to the security forces.

Political and fiscal decentralization.

Long-standing local intergroup tensions and horizontal inequalities that underscored the major conflicts were exacerbated by political marginalization by the state and a desire for greater self-determination. To address the grievances that were intensifying secessionist sentiment, the government recognized that ceding some central control of both power and resources was necessary to improve social stability and find resolution. Further motivation to decentralize came from the economic crisis the country faced in the 1990s. In return for taking the political and

practical risks of decentralizing, the government also recognized the potential of more fiscally efficient approaches to governance and resource management across the country's highly complex social makeup and geographic territory. The potential means to manage such extensive decentralization existed in Indonesia, due to its relatively high, although very uneven, human and institutional capacity.

Central Sulawesi and Maluku were given recovery aid (an estimated US\$300 million from the central government) that was placed outside the government's regular disbursement mechanism, allowing local-district heads to allocate resources at their discretion. Simultaneously, Aceh enacted political and fiscal autonomy provisions as part of the peace agreements, including laws for balanced formulas for previously marginalized areas, direct election of regional heads, and high degrees of local discretion in managing regional budgets. The decentralization measures were conducted in districts instead of in ethnically bounded provinces to mitigate the chance of separatist sentiment and ethnic politics. These changes were underpinned over the longer term by gradually improving political inclusion.


In the case of Timor-Leste, resolution eventually came in the form of full secession, despite intense political resistance from Indonesia and the Indonesian military's use of violence to dissuade citizens from voting for secession. While international pressure played a pivotal role in the government's eventual decision, the economic crisis also played a role. The government recognized that granting Timor-Leste its independence entailed lower fiscal and political costs than maintaining it as territory.

Reform of security forces. Indonesia's military had long played an active role in the country's politics. As such, security sector reform was particularly important in the move away from military dictatorship and toward democratization and durable peace—an important

(Box continued next page)

BOX 6.6 Decentralization and Security Reform as Prevention in Practice:
Indonesia (continued)

FIGURE B6.6.1 Foreign Direct Investment Net Flows as a Proportion of GDP in Indonesia, 1980–2015



Note: GDP = gross domestic product.

political and practical complement to decentralization. Indonesia took the crucial step of ensuring political impartiality of its armed forces by separating the police and military and establishing parliamentary oversight. In exchange for conceding domestic security tasks to a newly formed police force, the military received significant budgetary concessions and was allowed to retain its territorial command structure.

Impact of peacebuilding on the economy. While at first, this substantial political and security risk was further destabilizing, follow-through on the changes paid off, with increasing inflows of foreign direct investment as a percentage of gross domestic

product (GDP) and balance of payments (figure B6.6.1). The eventual institutional clarity was critical to ensuring that the government had the means subsequently to form and enforce peace deals in other areas over the longer term. The resulting more even power balance between the military and the government further disincentivized the use of force as an option for resolving conflict. Decisive action by the Indonesian police in the early 2000s to improve surveillance and antiterror operations in response to terrorist attacks helped to improve citizen confidence in the security forces. Indonesia's relatively strong institutional capacity was critical to facilitating and following through on changes.

Sources: Jaffrey 2017; Nygard et al. 2017.

Like most approaches to prevention, the effectiveness of decentralization requires parallel attention to other social and economic factors (Nygard et al. 2017), as well as to the capacity, legitimacy, and interests of recipients to govern and manage resources. In many cases, this purpose has been served

by combining decentralization with community-driven development (CDD). If managed well, CDD can ensure that the benefits of decentralization, such as greater local decision making and direct control of resources, trickle down to the local level and potentially lead to more efficient delivery of

services and, eventually, to measurable reductions in poverty. CDD projects can aim to reconfigure intergroup and state-community relations in order to influence local power relations and, as such, conflict dynamics. By addressing the risks of conflict related to an influx of resources, the goal is to make resources a force for progressive change. CDD in itself does not avoid violence; however, it can consolidate peace by promoting positive social change and influencing pathways through conflict (Barron, Diprose, and Woolcock 2006, 2007). It can also improve intergroup relations, help to share power at the village level, and even help to resolve disputes and conflicts.

Where CDD approaches have had limited success, this can be attributed largely to the low intensity of interventions, a mismatch in timeframes, or a lack of coherent and explicit theory of change (Bennett and D’Onofrio 2015; King and Samii 2014).

- In Afghanistan, the National Solidarity Program (NSP) created community councils and gave them small grants to start projects (Yemak, Gan, and Cheng 2013). The program—the largest development program in Afghanistan—has been credited with success for the fact that it is rooted in a local focus and scaled to existing capacity (Mashal 2015). It has brought CDD to all of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces and, in doing so, has overcome security challenges, prevailing gender norms, and suspicion of the central government (Beath, Christia, and Enikolopov 2015). By dividing resources into small packages, the NSP has avoided pitfalls such as large-scale corruption, while ensuring local ownership over projects. Although NSP has had some beneficial effects, including increased acceptance of democratic processes and improved perceptions of economic well-being, the positive effects regarding attitudes toward central and subnational government fell off soon after the completion of NSP-funded projects (Beath, Christia, and Enikolopov 2015).
- Indonesia implemented a large CDD program that included conflict

resolution mechanisms. A two-province study in Aceh of the Kecamatan Development Project—a framework through which more than US\$20 million in assistance was made available to more than 1,700 conflict-affected individual villages in block grants—finds that, while there is little evidence that the project itself has reduced levels of violent conflict, it has had “notable and positive” indirect impacts on the local institutional environment in the areas in which it operates (Barron, Diprose, and Woolcock 2006, 2007). CDD projects such as this can also complement local conflict mediation mechanisms, but they are unlikely to replace preexisting mechanisms. Where CDD projects complement ongoing governance reforms and local conflict mediation capacities, they can reinforce positive outcomes (Barron, Diprose, and Woolcock 2006, 2007).

Strengthening the Rule of Law

Security and justice issues have often been at the center of both challenges and solutions for violent conflict, as discussed in chapter 5. The country cases examined for this study underscore that there is no quick fix in addressing the risks of violent conflict that emerge from the security and justice arena or in realizing its full potential for prevention. Societies in high-risk or postconflict contexts must manage multiple, often competing, demands to address abuses of the past and demonstrate a clear departure from past practices, while simultaneously responding to the current security and justice needs of the population.

As discussed in chapter 3, violence is highly path-dependent; once it takes hold, incentives and systems begin to reorient themselves in ways that sustain violence. Violence often justifies beefing up military budgets and consolidating decision making within defense ministries. Altering the balance of power in favor of security forces has often worsened abuses during conflict and requires strong resistance to rebalancing power with other sectors once violence has ceased. To address this, many countries

move to increase the accountability and transparency of the security forces to signal a change of direction.

In most cases, increasing accountability and transparency has involved paying closer attention to the separation between military and policing functions. Indonesia worked to increase citizen trust in security forces by dividing the police from the military and setting up an oversight body within Parliament (Jaffrey 2017; box 6.6). The reform of the security sector in Tunisia, where the abuses and impunity of the internal security institutions served as a catalyst for the protests that ended the rule of President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, involved a move from “a police order to a police service” (Hanlon 2012, 8). The reform reorganized the security services into three bodies—the National Guard, the National Police, and Civil Protection (Hanlon 2012). Northern Ireland also underwent an extensive reform and transformation of police and policing mechanisms that involved creating an independent police ombudsman to encourage local accountability (Groenewald and von Tangen 2002).

Alongside such reforms, where ethnic or identity divides run deep, integrating marginalized ethnic or religious groups into the military has helped to defuse the salience of schisms (Brzoska 2006). Nepal’s eventual integration of some 1,500 Maoist combatants into the army in 2012 was a major breakthrough in lowering the risk of return to fighting (von Einsiedel and Salih 2017).¹⁴ The dissolution of the Maoist army was made significantly easier and less of a risk to the Maoists themselves by dint of the fact that it held political power at that stage (von Einsiedel and Salih 2017). In Burundi, a focus on maintaining parity in numbers between Hutus and Tutsis in military recruitment helped to promote inclusion and reconciliation (Samii 2013). In Kosovo, too, ethnic diversity in the police force was pursued as a deliberate policy by which to build community trust and create a less prejudiced institution (Heinemann-Grüder and Grebenschikov 2006; box 6.7).

Although the process of building trust takes time, decisive and clear measures to address failings can go a long way to restoring confidence and signaling intent.

BOX 6.7 Inclusion for Security Reform: Burundi, Kosovo, and Timor-Leste

Inclusion has proven indispensable to achieving lasting security sector reform, including with regard to establishing trust, as a critical ingredient for prevention. Inclusive approaches focus on transparency, view such reform as a public policy issue, and involve the full spectrum of social actors.

Burundi. Reforms began with the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement in 2000, which set the course for the country’s emergence from 12 years of devastating civil war. After a long legacy of military domination of politics, the military itself was interested in professionalizing and rebuilding its reputation. Although still facing serious political and practical challenges, the relative success of the military reforms

is noteworthy for the level of broad acceptance they achieved. This appears due to the inclusive and integrated approach to reform. Burundian military reforms, with international support, set out to be inclusive in two main ways: first, in addition to operational capability, reforms explicitly considered governance across multiple areas of government, prioritized political dialogue, and gradually included civil society and the experiences of neighboring countries; second, the Arusha Agreement stipulated that no more than 50 percent of the armed forces could be drawn from any one ethnic group and that membership was open to all Burundian citizens, including rebel factions. Along with a gradual approach to building trust, educating

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BOX 6.7 Inclusion for Security Reform: Burundi, Kosovo, and Timor-Leste *(continued)*

citizens, and increasing local ownership of the process, the reforms have been a significant part of implementing the Arusha Agreement, which so far, has avoided a return to full-scale civil war.

Kosovo. The explicit efforts to ensure multiethnic representation in the newly formed Kosovo police service were critical factors of successful community-level policing in postconflict Kosovo. In order to gain the confidence and trust of all ethnic communities and prevent further conflict in a deeply divided society, the new police service was to have minimum quotas for Kosovo-Albanians and Kosovo-Serbs, as well as 20 percent female officers. Without this kind of inclusion, it would likely have been impossible to extend effective policing to all areas of the country. Through training, different ethnic groups were obliged to interact, motivated at least by the need to keep their new job. While achieving a relative ethnic balance was difficult and took time, by 2005 the share of women in the police force (16 percent) exceeded that of most European forces (around 10 percent). Over time, levels of comfort and even comradery grew in a way that outpaced those in the wider communities, despite ongoing political divisions. International support for development of the police service from the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, in particular, was crucial. It provided not only funding but also impartial expertise, which enabled depoliticization of the police service. By 2008, the police service was almost entirely locally led. Community confidence in the police grew significantly, especially for

Kosovo-Albanians who had not shown any confidence in police previously. Polls in 2009 and 2010 showed the police to be the most trusted institution, with low levels of corruption and good community relationships.

Timor-Leste. Greater local leadership and local inclusion were key to implementing security sector reforms in Timor-Leste. Over the first decade after independence, the technical and administrative capability of security forces improved with largely imported processes. The second-generation changes to security reforms put more emphasis on a holistic, locally led approach. Once the donors' footprint in the reform process had started to decline, many instrumental reforms were brought about, increasing public trust in the state security and justice institutions. National actors became more assertive in leading the reform process, leveraging civil society, and engaging both formal and informal security providers. These inclusive steps "fostered slower, but deeper, more multifaceted, and therefore more sustainable societal, political, and cultural transformations concerning the role of security sector institutions in Timorese society." Instituting community policing, devolving conflict resolution to communities where appropriate, and creating interlinkages between formal and informal institutions all sought to improve inclusion. Public confidence and trust in the security and justice institutions improved, along with the perception of legitimacy of security institutions, which was previously a key challenge and a key driver of conflict in Timor-Leste.

Sources: Ball 2014; DCAF 2017; Dewhurst and Greising 2017; Greene, Friedman, and Bennett 2012; Heinemann-Grüder and Grebenschikov 2006; Stodiek 2006.

Allegations of political partisanship and human rights violations, including rape and excessive use of force, following Kenya's postelection violence in 2007–08 provided the impetus for security sector reform as

part of the 2010 constitution (Mogaka 2017). The reforms aimed to make the security institutions politically impartial and establish oversight over various security institutions, with the goal of restoring

popular trust in these institutions. Increasing the visibility and transparency of the police through joint action and dialogue with communities can help to build trust and signal a change in direction while reforms are implemented, as in Jamaica by way of innovative community-policing approaches (DCAF 2017). The bottom-up approaches adopted in the Kyrgyz Republic, Timor-Leste, and Uganda are more likely to produce direct and visible results in regard to creating inclusiveness, legitimacy, and responsiveness in security and justice provision (DCAF 2017).

Gender inclusion—through increasing the number of women in the security forces—has boosted community trust and reduced both the misconduct of police and the use of excessive force to deal with emerging threats (DCAF 2017). Bougainville, Papua New Guinea, where women have traditionally played a core role in conflict resolution, has been especially effective in integrating women into its policing structure (DCAF 2017). Nicaragua, too, has used a multifaceted approach, including strong political commitment, revised recruitment procedures, training, and dedicated women’s police stations, to attain a 26 percent female police staffing rate (DCAF 2017). This represents one of the highest proportions of female officers in the world and has contributed directly to Nicaragua having one of the lowest homicide rates in the region (DCAF 2017).

Establishing Forums for Peaceful Conflict Resolution

In the more successful cases, reforming institutions to foster incentives for peace has transcended a focus on national institutions and peace processes to focus on strengthening coordination across and building links between the myriad bodies that bear some responsibility for peacebuilding. A key lesson has been that, while national reforms play an important role, they are insufficient in themselves to support sustained peace. Local-level mechanisms offer a unique vantage point and cultural relevance for addressing conflict early on, while being contextually appropriate. However, they are

limited in their reach if not embedded in a regional or national framework. Similarly, national policies and strategies that do not connect to local initiatives will struggle to gain traction on the ground (Giessmann, Galvanek, and Seifert 2017).

The process of establishing these interlinkages is often referred to as building “infrastructures for peace,” defined as the organizational elements and linkages that form domestic “mechanisms of cooperation among all relevant stakeholders in peacebuilding by promoting cooperative problem solving to conflicts and institutionalizing the response mechanisms to conflicts in order to transform them” (van Tongeren 2001, 400; Geissman 2016). Strengthening these infrastructures has meant aligning successful local initiatives with national strategies, ensuring that resources flow effectively, and enhancing coordination (box 6.8).

Ghana’s comprehensive infrastructure for peace has succeeded in managing tensions and mitigating conflict risks, especially around elections, and has inspired neighboring countries to follow suit (Hopp-Nishanka 2012; box 6.9). The infrastructure includes a mediation, consensus-building, and advocacy role for the National Peace Council, with activities organized at national, regional, and district levels; a role for the judiciary; a role for the National Security Council; a traditional authority and alternative justice role for the National House of Chiefs; a watchdog and advocacy role for civil society; oversight by the legislature and independent national human rights body; and a role for the Electoral Commission. The national government also hosts a Peacebuilding Support Unit within the Ministry of the Interior to coordinate preventive efforts by all actors across the country. Electoral conflict and violence also provided Kenya with the impetus to transform its national conflict prevention and management architecture (Mogaka 2017). It has used district peace committees as the basis for a uniform national peace structure and has worked to build a multistakeholder approach (Mogaka 2017).

Niger provides another example of building effective infrastructures for peace

BOX 6.8 Infrastructures for Peace (I4P): Developing and Sustaining National Capacity

The concept of I4P encompasses the long-term, multilevel mechanisms and institutional structures for collaboration between stakeholders, including the state, civil society, and the private sector, to prevent and resolve violent conflict. There is no single ready-made model for I4P, and each country has to tailor it to its historical, institutional, and structural conditions. The concept was originally formulated in the 1980s by Lederach (1997), based on his experiences with local and national peace processes and the use of commissions in peace negotiations.

I4Ps can only be put in place through nationally owned and driven processes, but they are enhanced through global experience in building peace architectures to fit local needs. At different stages, they can also serve as an exit strategy for peacekeeping and political missions as well as development actors. They offer an assurance to national actors of the persistence of national institutions and constituencies that work for sustainable peace. National I4P can include various elements, including peace committees, peace secretariats, and national peacebuilding forums.

Peace committees bring together national and local institutions and

Sources: EU and UNDP 2014; Giessmann 2016.

focus on reducing violence, promoting dialogue, guiding problem-solving activities, encouraging community building, and working toward reconciliation. They typically capitalize on the skills of agents of change as mediators to bridge social, political, and economic divides. Peace committees are found at the national, regional, and local levels. They often include representatives of government, civil society, and political or traditional leaders and can be fully or partially integrated into the structures of the state.

Peace secretariats assist parties in negotiations by advancing and implementing the peace process. They fulfill their roles during peace negotiations by assisting in the creation of more permanent I4P entities. In particular, they coordinate with other institutions, create linkages between “tracks,” and streamline peacebuilding approaches.

National peacebuilding forums are multistakeholder platforms for consultation and collaboration. They are based on inclusive and interactive relationships and networks that establish spaces for collective action and systemic engagement.

BOX 6.9 Peace Committees and Early Warning Mechanisms: Kenya, Indonesia, and Ghana

Kenya has a history of bottom-up peacebuilding by local community structures. In the early 1990s the Women for Peace Committee was formed in response to an upsurge in communal conflict in what was then the Wajir District. Women worked across clans to mobilize youth and elders to work toward peace. Their efforts

included establishing Al-Fatah leaders and creating the Al-Fatah Declaration, which became the basis for resolving future community conflicts. Local government recognized the value added by local actors and encouraged the formation of district peace committees, which integrated local peacebuilders into district development and security

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BOX 6.9 Peace Committees and Early Warning Mechanisms: Kenya, Indonesia, and Ghana *(continued)*

committees. This marked a milestone for introducing multistakeholder approaches to conflict prevention in Kenya. In the early 2000s, the government-established National Steering Committee on Peacebuilding and Conflict Management and a conflict early warning and response mechanism also became important platforms for conflict prevention. The latter, however, initially focused narrowly on cross-border conflict in the Karamoja and Somali clusters. This focus later expanded to national coverage of more than just cross-border pastoralist conflict. The National Council of Churches in Kenya has offered critical support to interethnic and interfaith dialogue at local and national levels, including mechanisms such as study tours to learn from the experience of ethnic violence in Rwanda. Civil society organizations and nongovernmental organizations played a prominent role prior to the 2013 election by promoting peace through various activities. Initiatives include their participation in the Uwiano platform—a multistakeholder platform that brought together government institutions, civil society, and development actors—ahead of the 2010 constitution to prevent political violence similar to what occurred during the 2005 referendum.

Indonesia also established programs to monitor, prepare for, and respond to violence that integrated civilian, state, and international mechanisms. The Aceh Monitoring Mission, composed of civilians, reported on violations of the memorandum of understanding between the Free Aceh Movement and the government. Aceh conflict monitoring updates, provided by the World Bank, tracked violent incidents across the province through local media reports. The National Violence Monitoring System, developed from the work of the World Bank and the National Planning Agency, collected data on postconflict violence in affected regions. These data were used to inform the future allocation of

resources, develop regional development plans, and enhance early mediation efforts in local conflict. Indonesia's police, concerned about increasing terrorist activity on Indonesian soil, worked to improve surveillance capacity (for example, in Central Sulawesi after the peace agreement, where several terror networks participated in anti-Christian violence).

Ghana's comprehensive institutional setup has been instrumental in preventing violence. The architecture combines regional-, national-, and local-level institutions with multiple dimensions of government, civil society, and dialogue mechanisms. The Northern Regional Peace Advisory Council was set up in 2004, followed by the National Peace Council, 10 regional peace councils, and district advisory councils. These mechanisms have featured prominently in preventing and addressing violence, including around the 2012 elections. Traditional and religious organizations play an important role as nonstate mechanisms in prevention of violent conflict. Chiefs or Queen mothers, the Earth priest, clan heads, family heads, and religious leaders are key stakeholders in the prevention process. Religious leaders are especially important in the northern savannah zone, where interethnic conflicts appear endemic. Early warning systems exist, with support from international actors. The National and Regional Peace Council set up the National and Regional Election Early Warning System in all regional capitals, along with response strategies to contain potential threats. The Media Foundation for West Africa also monitors campaign language on the radio during election time to keep track of hate speech and indecent campaign language. Military deployment appears to be used widely and effectively for conflict prevention. Security personnel have been sent to volatile areas to mitigate tensions, such as in the Yendi conflict.

Sources : Bob-Milliar 2017; Jaffrey 2017; Mogaka 2017.

(Pérouse de Montclos 2017). The Haute Autorité à La Consolidation de la Paix, led by a Tuareg since it was launched in 2011, has been successful in managing relations with the various communities in the north of the country (box 6.5). The HACP is one of the reasons the country has been more effective in managing conflicts with the Tuareg populations in the north than with Boko Haram in the south (Pérouse de Montclos 2017).

Civil society, religious bodies, and private sector actors can maximize their contributions by plugging into broader networks. The Christian Council of Lesotho has played the role of mediator and interlocutor between conflicting parties in the country for the last few decades (Giessmann, Galvanek, and Seifert 2017). Due to its success in mediating all election-related processes since the end of military rule in 1993, assisting with the nonviolent transition of power in 2012, and helping to build mediation and conflict resolution capacity across the country, the Christian Council of Lesotho was recognized as *de facto* mediator-in-chief by both Lesotho's state authorities and the Electoral Commission in 2009. Other influential actors have also recognized its role, including the Lesotho Council of Non-Governmental Organizations as well as international partners and regional organizations (Giessmann, Galvanek, and Seifert 2017).

The Peace Messengers program in the Kyrgyz Republic between 2010 and 2015 created teams of peace mediators drawn from local communities (Giessmann, Galvanek, and Seifert 2017). The teams were made up of local decision makers, community elders, religious leaders, informal neighborhood leaders, women's committees, head teachers, and others. Their prevention activities helped to keep local disputes from escalating and protected local mediation processes from external pressures. However, the program failed to create self-sustaining capacity for conflict prevention, in part because the external funding on which it was reliant dried up before it was firmly anchored into local structures (Giessmann, Galvanek, and Seifert 2017).

Comparative analysis suggests that local peace committees helped to lower the risk of violence overall and, in particular, to reduce the risk that localized insecurity could escalate.¹⁵ Local-level structures often have the most immediate and pressing incentives to maintain peace and work toward prevention. Local peace committees can build on local incentives, capacity, and relationships. They provide “an alternative institutional framework for mediating local disputes, responding to crises, harnessing a range of local capacities through peacebuilding networks” (Sisk 2017), mapping resources and issues, and linking local and national contexts. For such committees, civil society and the private sector have proven indispensable as interlocutors and mediators, particularly in the presence of a high degree of political corruption, organized crime, and dysfunctional state institutions.

Challenges arise in several areas. Where peace committees are well resourced, they have become targets of capture by groups seeking rents or attempting to advance specific interests, which may not be in the interests of broader peace (Sisk 2017). In other cases, peace committees have suffered from weak capacity, unclear mandates, and politicization. Finally, peace committees can be seriously challenged if they result in a parallel structure to the formal conflict resolution mechanisms. For example, following the cessation of conflict in Nepal, the minister of peace and reconstruction—with support from the Nepal Peace Trust Fund—established local peace committees in almost all of the country's 75 districts to help to maintain peace at the local level. Although a few of these have had some success at inclusive peacebuilding, von Einsiedel and Salih (2017) argue that it would have been more effective to promote mediation activities within the established district- and local-level development committees rather than attempting to build a parallel structure.

Investing in Structural Factors

Tackling the structural challenges to achieving sustained peace is the final critical area

for domestic action to be examined in this chapter. Structural factors comprise the foundational elements of society and shape the overall environment in which actors make decisions. These factors usually change slowly and require time, patience, and a long-term vision. However, it is possible to tackle these factors and to address the risks they present through targeted action. Economic reforms, redistributive policies, and infrastructure investments, for example, all can foster structural changes that reduce the risk of violence.

Chapters 3 and 4 discuss some of the structural factors that feature prominently in many conflicts, in particular, patterns of socioeconomic exclusion and inequality across groups, while chapter 5 examines the arenas of contestation in which these grievances accumulate. This section highlights the efforts of countries to manage structural factors by addressing social and economic grievances via reforms related to access to and redistribution of land, by increasing equity in the distribution of resource revenues, and by engaging in efforts to heal social divisions.

Addressing Economic and Social Grievances

Perceptions of exclusion present a major risk for violent conflict, as discussed in chapters 4 and 5. By focusing on the arenas of contestation—power and governance, access to land and natural resources, delivery of services, and justice and security—countries have taken various measures to address grievances by fostering greater access and redistributing benefits. In some cases, these measures have come about because of a peace agreement or a new constitution and have been incorporated into national development plans. The 2030 Agenda offers an important framework for addressing many grievances and building consensus around the ways to ameliorate them. In other cases, they have involved stand-alone, targeted efforts to address the source of a grievance.

Many countries have negotiated broad-based development plans that transcend

peace agreements in a bid to address social and economic issues:

- Kenya recognized the destabilizing potential of regional imbalances and in Vision 2030, its national long-term development blueprint, committed to invest in marginalized areas to unlock their development potential, while contributing to spatial and national inclusion (Mogaka 2017). The 2010 constitution also made provisions for an equalization fund to improve the delivery of basic services to marginalized areas in a bid to bring service provision up to the levels experienced across the rest of the country.
- Indonesia's 2015–19 National Mid-Term Development Plan looks to address political, economic, security, and environmental dimensions through national, regional, and sectoral responses (Jaffrey 2017). Among other objectives, the plan aims to reduce inequality, develop peripheral areas, act against corruption, improve security, implement good governance, address law and justice, and advance social reform (Steven and Gerlach 2017).
- Niger's Renaissance project under President Issoufou attempts to reduce poverty across the nation as part of a strategy to address social and economic grievances that could translate into conflict risks (Pérouse de Montclos 2017).

Redistribution is always a contentious process because it necessarily creates winners and losers. In the country cases examined for this study, the process by which resources and access were redefined made a critical difference in determining the credibility, fairness, and sustainability of the reforms. These complex mechanisms pose major challenges for countries with limited fiscal space and limited capacities. They also require political will from the top level down to the local level. Some countries, such as Indonesia, found ways to mobilize political will while the reforms were implemented and eventually even garnered support for reforms from former opponents (Jaffrey 2017).

Specifically, three overarching lessons have emerged from successful cases: first, establishing a formula for redistribution that is viewed as fair by different groups; second, creating mechanisms to ensure that funds are distributed as the state claims they will be; and third, ensuring that the funds or services are delivered in an inclusive manner and viewed by the local population as appropriate. The 2030 Agenda offers entry points to apply all three lessons.

Leaders are often under intense pressure to deliver tangible results in the immediate term as they seek to influence incentives for peace.

- Following the conflict in Aceh, the Indonesian central government was aware of the importance of signaling its commitment to the peace process in Aceh (Jaffrey 2017). It prioritized highly visible projects that would serve the dual goal of neutralizing spoilers, while improving the image of the central government. It provided reintegration assistance to former combatants in an effort to stop them from sabotaging the agreement and assistance to civilians in order to boost popular support for the peace process. To avoid the impression that the Acehnese were being compensated for past abuses, much of the civilian aid was disbursed in the form of disaster recovery efforts (Jaffrey 2017). A particular challenge in this case was that postdisaster aid did not fully reflect the postconflict realities, as the funds provided were inadequate to address damage and losses caused by the conflict (MSR 2009).
- Similarly, Ghana focused funds for the north on the critical areas of improving services, health, education, and some economic infrastructure to create government visibility and legitimacy at the local level (Steven and Gerlach 2017). The comprehensive program of subnational investment, which helped the country to bridge a north-south divide and bolstered political inclusion at the local level, also saw the transfer of resources from the central to the local government between 1995 and

2014 (World Bank 2006). The program under the District Assembly Common Fund¹⁶ weighs various factors, including “need,” and accounts for differences in the quality of public services across districts. Between 2001 and 2007, more funds from the central government made their way to less prosperous districts than to those that were economically more robust. In all regions, an increase in external revenue from the government boosted the delivery of basic services.

In some countries, redistribution policies have taken the form of integrating neglected parts of urban centers into the broader city, as highlighted also in SDG target 11.1. In these cases, increasing the presence and responsiveness of the state via the rollout of basic services is critical. During the 1990s in Medellín, Colombia, a growing drug trade overtook many slum areas that were economically and socially disconnected from the rest of the city (Steven and Gerlach 2017). A decade later, “social urbanism” had transformed Medellín from one of the most violent cities in the world to one of the most progressive (Turok 2014). City institutions joined forces with other spheres of government to push a development approach based on a commitment to social inclusion and equity. The city government invested heavily in participatory processes to increase citizen voice in urban planning and in building infrastructure to connect slum areas with the broader city, including a cable car system, public parks, and libraries designed by world-renowned architects. Expansion of basic services, including a community policing initiative, and greater investment in schools and health services were credited with helping to bring down levels of violence and improving public perceptions of the state (Steven and Gerlach 2017). Economic development was also propelled by catalytic projects to rehabilitate former industrial sites and rundown buildings, generating jobs in the city (Turok 2014).

Broadening access and improving quality of education have been another

important element addressing grievances around exclusion. The positive impacts seem to stem less from efforts to address a specific grievance (lack of education) than from indirect effects (the role of education in improving lives generally). Support for education signals government intent, providing conflict resolution tools, addressing the social acceptability of violence, and strengthening a sense of confidence in the future. The evidence is particularly strong for the link between government expenditure on education and availability of secondary education (particularly for young men) and peace (Nygard et al. 2017). Ghana and Northern Ireland both focused on education as a means of furthering social inclusion (Bob-Milliar 2017; Walsh 2017).

Resolving Land- and Resource-Related Grievances

Grievances relating to perceptions of unfairness and exclusion in access to and ownership of land can heighten the risks of violent conflict. Left unaddressed, they represent a major source of risk, particularly where grievances have deep historical antecedents, as seen in chapter 5. The centrality of addressing structural issues related to land distribution and sustained prevention is underscored in the example of Colombia, where the protection, formalization, and restitution of land to displaced people have been a core plank of Colombia's ongoing peace process (World Bank 2016d; box 6.10). Country efforts to address the sources of these grievances have focused

BOX 6.10 Land Protection for the Forcibly Displaced in Colombia

Colombia's long-running civil war between government forces, including paramilitary forces, and insurgent guerrilla groups caused large-scale displacement of the population. Land, territory, and the lack of institutional security for land tenure in rural areas were at the heart of the conflict. Disputes over land between tenants and large-scale farmers began as early as the 1920s and were core to the long-running civil war. Cycles of violence continued, fueled, in part, by unresolved land questions and calls for land reform, and were accompanied by massive land seizures and the forced displacement of roughly 2 million small-scale farmers from rural land to urban areas (World Bank 2016d). Tensions brought about by structural inequality, political exclusion, and forced dispossession of the land by large landowners erupted into war in the 1960s, spurred by the leftist ideology espoused by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army. The conflict escalated in the 1980s, as armed groups found new sources of financing in the illegal drug trade. The number of

displaced rural dwellers peaked in 2002 at 447,429. In all, the conflict displaced between 3 million and 5 million people.

In 1997, the government passed the first comprehensive law (Law 387) with measures to prevent forced displacement and to address challenges faced by its internally displaced citizens, including loss of productive assets. The Victims and Land Restitution Law of 2011 created the formal framework for the restitution of land to internally displaced persons. Between 2002 and 2014, donors supported and funded a three-part program to promote the protection, formalization, and restitution in order to support internally displaced persons and the peacebuilding process. Through systematic data collection and research to address specific land tenure issues, the project built the knowledge base and policy support for the Restitution Law. This law, and the land restitution process it promotes, despite having been associated with some violence against potential returnees, was a key plank of the 2016 peace deal between the government and FARC.

Source: Amnesty International 2014; Observatorio de Tierras 2017; World Bank 2015a, 2016a.

largely on land reform to promote redistribution of and expand access to land. For instance, in Uganda, the Commission for the Return of Properties to Departed Asians legally affirmed specific property rights, thus administering justice and serving the national interest of reestablishing international recognition and legitimacy of government (Colletta and Oppenheim 2017).

Some countries have had success in addressing the risks of violent conflict through schemes to redistribute underutilized land, as in Malawi, where the inheritance of colonial estates by a small number of large landowners created a situation of frequent land encroachments by a large number of land-poor citizens (Chinigò 2016; Machira 2009). In 2004, amid mounting social tensions, the government launched a community-based rural land development project, aimed to redistribute underutilized portions of large estates among the landless poor, around Blantyre, in southern Malawi. The project aimed to transfer land to about 15,000 poor, rural families through subsidized transactions, while also addressing titling and registration of the new holdings. In total, the government successfully reallocated 27,988 hectares to 12,656 families and helped to ease tensions among the landless poor in that region, despite coming up against some resistance from large landowners (Chinigò 2016; Machira 2009).

In Kenya, where contestations over land use and management have also formed the basis of much conflict, land is likened to the “fulcrum around which everything revolves” (Kanyinga 2005). To address this, the 2010 constitution provided for detailed policies and the creation of institutions designed to improve the management of land (Mogaka 2017). The National Land Commission was subsequently established to manage public land on behalf of the two levels of government, while the reforms also sought to address the grievances of communities and reduce the power of the executive over land management. Although the process has faced numerous challenges, and implementation remains incomplete, progress in land reforms has helped alleviate some of the risks related to land allocation

that had been commonplace previously (Mogaka 2017).

Some countries have addressed the risk of extractives-related violent conflict by enhancing transparency in revenue sharing and dealing with perceptions of equity, as well as by devolving greater control of revenues to producing regions. Several SDGs offer entry points in this regard. Nigeria, for example, has instituted a formula for distributing the proceeds from extractives, in a bid to manage tensions related to perceptions of unfairness in the allocation of resource revenues. Although 95 percent of export earnings and 65 percent of government revenues in Nigeria came from the oil and gas sector in 2010, only 9 out of 36 states produced oil (Aguilar, Caspary, and Seiler 2011). The northern states have supported the principle of land mass and population as criteria for resource distribution, while the oil-producing states have argued in favor of a derivative principle by which they receive larger allocations. Since 1993, 13 percent of oil proceeds have been distributed among the 25 percent of states that produce oil (Eze 2013).

As discussed in more detail in chapter 5, the decentralization of natural resource revenues and decision making has been seen as a way to counter grievances related to resources at the local level. This approach has had mixed success, however, as in Ghana, where the Mineral Development Fund facilitated local-level revenue sharing but introduced new forms of inequality and reinforced elite capture (Standing and Hilson 2013).

Confronting the Past and Building Social Cohesion

Social relationships form the cornerstone of a society’s ability to manage conflict constructively. Resilient relationships in which people and groups have an incentive to cooperate, or at least coexist, without violence, form the basis for effective institutions and pathways toward sustainable peace (Marc et al. 2012). Violent conflict deepens social divisions and erodes trust between social groups and the state. While physical infrastructure can be rebuilt over a

period of months or years, repairing the damage to the social fabric can take generations. Rebuilding trust and cohesion is therefore a critical element in preventing further cycles of violence.

In the case studies prepared for this study, most countries have found it necessary to take some measures toward reckoning with the events of the past to build the trust to move forward. These efforts have taken a variety of forms. Formal truth commissions in Sierra Leone and Tunisia brought people together to help close and heal the divides between groups, lessening the threat of a relapse into violence (Ainley, Friedman, and Mahony 2016). In the Central African Republic, a hybrid national-international special criminal court is being set up to address grievances regarding impunity (Lombard 2017). However, it faces multiple challenges, not least being decisions regarding whom to prosecute, how to rebuild trust, and how to avoid the perception that its choices are politically motivated.

In some cases, addressing past abuse has been dealt with through less judicial processes, including official apologies and truth-telling processes, as in Sierra Leone (Ainley, Friedman, and Mahony 2016; ICTJ 2016) or recognition of suffering and material reparations for victims, as in Argentina (De Greiff 2008). Tunisia's Truth and Dignity Commission established a record on Ben Ali-era abuses, including on systematic corruption, with parallel intent for national criminal prosecutions (ICTJ 2016). These processes have helped to prevent violent outbreaks similar to other Arab Spring political changes. In the Philippines, the recognition of historical injustice over more than 200 years, including state expropriation of land of the Bangsamoro community in Mindanao, was part of the comprehensive peace agreement in 2014 and helped to alleviate social and political polarization (TJRC 2016). The work of the Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation Commission was carried out subsequent to signing of the peace agreement, in spite of the fact that implementation of the agreement had stalled.

As discussed in chapter 5, transitional justice mechanisms are often adopted in

postconflict contexts in order to provide recourse for victims of crimes and promote reconciliation. While evidence on the value of transitional justice in preventing recurrence of violence is quite limited overall (Payne et al. 2017), the country experiences examined for this study suggest that such measures can help to increase confidence in a new government and rule-of-law institutions and to rebuild civic trust (World Bank 2011).

There are, however, cases where the *absence* of justice provisions for conflict-era crimes has helped to bring warring parties together in more informal forums. In Indonesia, the absence of justice provisions in peace agreements helped to bring combatants to the negotiating table in the short term (Jaffrey 2017). In the long term, however, the absence of acknowledgement and punishment for past abuses has remained an obstacle to the full reconciliation of religious communities in Maluku and Sulawesi. Lack of trust and the memory of ills done have led to a stratification of residential areas and hampered interaction of the two communities (Jaffrey 2017).

Conclusion

This chapter draws out some common elements of effective prevention based on an analysis of the country cases commissioned for this study. Drawing on the framework for the study, it describes the experience of national actors in four key areas: shaping the incentives of actors for peace, reforming institutions to foster inclusion, addressing structural factors that feed into grievances, and highlighting the possible role of the 2030 Agenda. From these experiences, common patterns emerge, even if specific prescriptions do not.

A central dilemma for all countries examined is that the incentives for violence are often certain and specific to an individual or group, while the incentives for peace are often uncertain and diffuse (World Bank 2017b). To shape incentives and reduce or share risk across a broader range of actors, the more successful cases mobilized a range of domestic actors, bringing in the comparative advantages of civil society,

the faith community, and the private sector to manage tensions and influence incentives toward peace. Governments introduced both long-term reforms or investments targeting structural factors, at the same time implementing immediate initiatives that buttressed confidence in commitments to more inclusive processes.

Nevertheless, before or after violence, most of the countries examined that have found pathways to sustaining peace have eventually tackled the messy and contested process of institutional reform to address the risk of violence. Expanding access to the arenas of contestation has been a key part of this effort, in order to increase representation and alleviate grievances related to exclusion. Often, the transition moment that led to sustainable peace was based on a shift away from security-led responses and toward broader approaches that mobilized a range of sectors.

In many cases, governments planned socioeconomic development, undertook reforms, launched security operations, and managed political life, even while violence was ongoing. In these experiences, the greatest challenge lay not so much in accessing knowledge, but in the contentious process of identifying and prioritizing risks. Conflict did not bring a windfall of resources: a diversion of development investments into peaceful areas and a move to equip and support police, military, or security operations strained national budgets. Rather than creating the space for the more forward-looking decision making that is needed to establish the institutional or structural conditions for sustainable peace, violence narrowed the options. For this reason, preventive action was at times contrary to popular demands for visible and tangible security measures over longer-term, more complex responses that could address the causes of violence.

In these processes, formal political settlements—or at least durable settlements—were important, but also rare events on the pathway for peace. Approaches to preventing violence or resolving violent conflict, once started, often resulted from government policies of investment, security, and diplomatic action put in place long before a

political process was initiated or formalized. In some cases, political settlements were applied only to address specific aspects of conflict, while underlying causes were targeted more comprehensively through government action. In others, political settlements were not used as part of the prevention process at all.

In many cases, states sought international support in these endeavors. The next chapter turns to the role of international actors in supporting domestic processes.

Notes

1. These commonalities are derived from the country case studies and research commissioned for this study as well as broader relevant literature. The case studies cover Burkina Faso, Burundi, the Central African Republic, Côte d'Ivoire, the Arab Republic of Egypt, Ghana, Guatemala, Indonesia, Jordan, Kenya, the Kyrgyz Republic, Malawi, Morocco, Nepal, Niger, Northern Ireland, Sierra Leone, South Sudan, and Tunisia.
2. Here, “transformational” reflects the definition from World Bank (2016c), which defines transformational engagements as “interventions or series of interventions that support deep, systemic, and sustainable change with the potential for large-scale impact in an area of a major development challenge.”
3. Since 2009 (Pittsburgh Communiqué), for instance, the G-20 has called on concerned countries to rationalize and phase out inefficient fossil-fuel subsidies, while compensating the poor and vulnerable and ensuring their access to energy. This commitment was reaffirmed in the 2010 summit in Busan, the 2012 meeting in Los Cabos, and the 2013 summit in Saint Petersburg.
4. According to OECD (2012), “An important condition for subsidy reform is the credibility of the government’s commitment to compensate vulnerable groups ... and to use the freed public funds in a beneficial way.”
5. Once a social protection policy is introduced, it is hard to reverse, regardless of any changes in the underlying subsidy policy, because such reversals entail political risks: the recipients now feel entitled to benefits.

6. Recent analysis reflecting best practices in subsidy reform calls for the use of social safety nets as a necessary element.
7. Clements et al. (2013) point to Indonesia as an example of successful and thoughtful planning of the use of social safety nets to overcome political economy and social concerns.
8. At the community level, civic organizations that cut across ethnic lines had a fundamental role in keeping a community stable and peaceful versus those communities that did not have such structures.
9. In 2000, Serbia was known as Serbia and Montenegro.
10. According to UNESCO (2008), “Education for non-violence and peace includes training, skills, and information directed towards cultivating a culture of peace based on human rights principles ... The learning objectives of peace education may include an understanding of the manifestations of violence, the development of capacities to respond constructively to that violence, and specific knowledge of alternatives to violence. Two fundamental concepts of peace education are respect and skills. Respect refers to the development of respect for self and for others; skills refer to specific communication, cooperation, and behavioral skills used in conflict situations.”
11. Political inclusion here is used broadly to describe meaningful inclusion of groups or individuals in politically salient dialogue or processes, whether part of formal governance institutions or informal processes (see Call 2012).
12. Here decentralization refers to territorially based autonomous political authority and decentralized political systems. Federalism or decentralization entails regional political autonomy from the capital; it is a combination of self-rule and shared rule that can preserve peace by “retain[ing] the territorial integrity of the state while providing some form of self-governance for disaffected groups” (Bakke and Wibbels 2006, 5).
13. See, for example, <http://www.u4.no/publications/corruption-and-decentralisation-in-afghanistan/>.
14. Serious challenges to the integration efforts remain, however, with continuing perceptions of unfairness spurring the formation of some splinter groups.
15. For a comparative analysis of peace committees, see Odendaal (2010, 2013); van Tongeren (2013).
16. External revenue comprises (1) the District Assembly Common Fund, (2) transfers from the central government to support the salaries of local government officials, (3) donor funds, (4) the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries fund, (5) school feeding, and (6) the District Development Facility. The District Assembly Common Fund is the main vehicle for intergovernmental transfers.

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